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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis analyzes the diverse environmental narratives found in more than 200 
stories published by two Mexican national newspapers, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, in 
1983 and 1984, a period of economic and environmental crisis. It argues that the 
popularity of environmental issues permitted column space for journalists, 
environmentalists, researchers, rural peasants, the urban poor, and government 
administrators to present their many different environmental narratives for the reading 
public’s consideration. Focusing on how journalists and their sources described air 
pollution, forests, and water crises in the pages of Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, this thesis 
brings out many of the common themes and persuasive tactics these narrative crafters 
utilized in their efforts to imprint an environmental perception on the national population. 
While environmentalists, researchers, and the poor contributed narratives which 
illuminated environmental crises and blamed them on Mexico’s industries and federal 
government, a smaller number of government spokespeople constructed narratives which 
promoted an environmentally-friendly image of a government that was attuned to these 
crises and best suited to address them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Many Environmental Narratives of Mexico 
 
Armed with machetes and clubs, 2,000 campesinos (peasant farmers) from 
southwest Tabasco established blockades near the town of Chontalpa in the autumn of 
1983 in order to deny Mexico’s national oil company, Pemex, access to 300 of its oil 
wells. The campesinos claimed that repeated oil spills over the last twenty-five years had 
rendered their once rich lands unproductive, and that Pemex had failed to deliver on 
promised compensation for damages of 4,123,000,000 pesos (about twenty-eight million 
1983 US dollars). One of these campesinos, Isaac De la Cruz Arévalo, told Excélsior 
reporter A. Sepulveda I., “we are not willing to put up with any more tricks from Pemex, 
or from anyone else. We will fight for the payment of the compensation even at the cost 
of our lives.”1 
As a reporter covering the blockade, Sepulveda played a critical role in explaining 
the campesinos’ struggle to the nation. The blockaders could relate their side of the story 
to the reporters covering the blockade, but reporters wrote the stories read by the nation. 
Any personal biases or ulterior motives held by reporters shaped their telling of the story. 
                                                 
1 A. Sepulveda I., “Bloquean labriegos 300 pozos de Pemex,” Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), 
Oct. 1, 1983; In this thesis, all of the translations from Spanish to English are my own. 
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Therefore, reporters reshaped the narrative of the crisis to the nation at large in writing 
the stories.2 While Sepulveda chose to criticize Pemex for damaging the land, another 
reporter covering this story might have written off the peasants as unreasonable agitators. 
For those who read the explanation of events printed in Excélsior, Sepulveda’s 
description contributed to the understanding of the reality of the Chontalpa blockade. 
Newspaper reporters, therefore, played an outsize role in crafting the many national 
narratives on pollution, conservation, and other environmental issues. 
In analyzing the environmental narratives published in two national newspapers, 
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, several major themes appear: blaming some entity for an 
environmental problem, linking environmental problems to health risks, and defending 
the federal government’s handling of environmental issues. Environmentalist reporters 
frequently blamed industry or the government for causing pollution or failing to regulate 
it.3  They also criticized government policies that permitted the unsustainable use of 
natural resources like forests. Government-friendly reporters, on the other hand, 
frequently criticized Mexican society for lacking environmental awareness. Many of 
these reporters blamed campesino subsistence-logging for the loss of forest resources or 
the urban poor for contaminating water resources. Government-friendly reporters also 
tended to promote the federal government as the appropriate channel through which 
                                                 
2 In 1980s Mexico, and in many countries today, the media plays a large role in defining which 
issues are social problems and which are not. For more analysis on the implications of this phenomenon 
see: Mark Neuzil, The Environment and the Press: From Adventure Writing to Advocacy (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2008), 192. 
3 This is a common theme in Latin America. See: Silvio Waisbord, “Contesting Extractivism: 
Media and Environmental Citizenship in Latin America,” in Environmental Conflict and the Media ed. 
Libby Lester and Brett Hutchins (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2013), 107-09. 
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environmental problems could be redressed, and often touted current government policy 
as environmentally-friendly. 
These two newspapers, therefore, served as a platform from which reporters and 
their sources sought to convince the public of the accuracy of their environmental 
narratives, which included attempts to shape Mexicans’ perceptions of the current 
condition of the environment.  Analyzing common themes in these national 
environmental narratives permits a more comprehensive understanding of how Excélsior 
and Uno Más Uno journalists presented these issues for public debate. The prevalence of 
environmental stories in these papers in 1983 and 1984 suggests that environmental 
issues were popular enough among readers for editors and journalists to deem them 
worthy of coverage. This popularity permitted column space for the proliferation of the 
many environmental narratives competing for public attention. Excélsior and Uno Más 
Uno, therefore, in using the environment to sell papers, also encouraged a discourse on 
environmental issues which added, in turn, to readers’ understandings of Mexico’s 
environment. 
This thesis examines the discourse on Mexico’s environmental narratives through 
an analysis of more than 200 environmental news stories from two national newspapers, 
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, in the years 1983 and 1984. The stories in this sample came 
from an archive of around 8,000 environmental news stories assembled by political 
scientist Stephen Mumme for his research into environmental politics in Mexico during 
the 1980s and early 1990s. By focusing on a smaller sample within the archive, this thesis 
conducts a deeper analysis on the selected articles than would be permitted if the sample 
size was larger. Furthermore, by delimiting the analysis to two newspapers within a 
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narrow time frame, this thesis provides a richer characterization of the content it does 
cover than could be conducted on the entire archive, given the constraints of this project. 
The sample used for this thesis includes 216 stories in chronological order, and displays a 
breadth of topics and styles.4 Journalists covered many different environmental topics, 
including agricultural problems, conservation efforts, erosion and desertification, 
problems with garbage dumps, illegal animal smuggling, dangers from pesticides, air 
pollution, forests, and water crises. This thesis focuses on the final three topics listed 
because journalists covered them more frequently in this sample than any other topics.5 
The stories from Excélsior span from August 2, through October 28, 1983, and the stories 
from Uno Más Uno span from April 1, through October 12, 1984. 
Newspaper Name Date Range Number of Articles 
Excélsior 
Aug. 2 – Oct. 28, 1983, 
January 10 – Feb 3, 1984 
92 
Uno Más Uno Apr. 1 – Oct. 12, 1984 124 
 
The sample covers a period between an important international summit on 
pollution between Mexico and the United States in the summer of 1983 and the first 
Mexican National Congress on the Environment held in the summer of 1984. Mexico 
faced a succession of environmental crises during this period, and the government-
orchestrated environmental meetings demonstrated a need for the federal government to 
                                                 
4 The sources are chronological with the exception of a 14-series editorial by Raul Olmedo entitled 
“Our Lost Forests which ran in Excélsior in January-February 1984. 
5 In categorizing articles into topics, I read the article and categorized it based on its content. 
Sometimes articles covered multiple topics. In these instances I placed the article into multiple categories.  
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respond to these crises. This period nicely exhibits the lively discourse surrounding 
Mexico’s environmental narrative. 
Mumme’s archive presents different challenges than would a Mexican newspaper 
archive. For one, Mumme may have missed some articles, or ignored certain issues that 
were not of interest to him. However, in a correspondence, Mumme indicated he was able 
to “achieve complete coverage” of environmental issues in 1983 and 1984 in Excélsior 
and Uno Más Uno.6 Regardless of whether his claim is legitimate or merely an 
exaggeration, the diversity of articles Mumme assembled still provide enough examples 
to understand which environmental issues appeared most frequently in newsprint, and the 
quantity of articles he collected still demonstrate a journalistic concern over 
environmental issues. In the sample used for this thesis, for example, Excélsior averaged 
about eight environmental stories a week while Uno Más Uno averaged fourteen. 
An analysis of Excélsior and Uno Más Uno during this period showcases 
environmental reporting from both a pro-government (Excélsior) and an independent 
(Uno Más Uno) newspaper. Because Excélsior and Uno Más Uno represented different 
ends of the ideological spectrum they serve as great contrasting examples by which to 
analyze the different ways in which Mexican reporters covered environmental issues. In 
the early 1970s, Excélsior had been an independent paper, and a vocal critic of 
government policies. But in 1976, the federal government expelled the chief editor and 
many other top editors and installed a government-friendly team. More than 200 
employees quit in solidarity, and many of them helped to establish Uno Más Uno, which 
                                                 
6 Stephen Mumme, e-mail message to author, August 28, 2015. 
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started publishing news stories on November 14, 1977. In 1983 and 1984, Excélsior 
operated as a government-friendly newspaper, and Uno Más Uno prided itself on fact-
based investigative reporting.7 
Communication scholar Sallie Hughes argued that in the 1980s Mexican 
journalism was in a period of transition, in which the role of journalists shifted from 
being mouthpieces of the state to becoming servants of the public. Before this transition, 
the majority of Mexican journalists viewed themselves as honorary government 
employees – even though they officially worked for a newspaper – and they in turn 
churned out stories echoing the government line. Hughes argued that this arrangement 
protected the government from criticism while providing the journalists with job security. 
Hughes labeled this model “authoritarian journalism” and the emerging model “civic 
journalism.”8 Although this thesis reveals that Excélsior tends to fit Hughes’s 
authoritarian model by supporting the government’s environmental policies, and Uno 
Más Uno tends to fit Hughes’s civic model by criticizing the government, the bias in 
either paper is not absolute. Stories bucking the respective trends exist in both Excélsior 
and Uno Más Uno, demonstrating that some reporters, at least, had the freedom to assert 
their own opinions even if they conflicted with the newspaper’s philosophy. 
Reporters who wrote frequently for these papers, however, generally fit well with 
their respective papers’ ideological orientations. Teresa Weiser, for example, covered 
environmental issues for Uno Más Uno, and wrote twenty-three of the reports in this 
                                                 
7 Chappell Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in 
Mexico (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 66-68;  
8 Sallie Hughes, Newsroom in Conflict: Journalism and the Democratization of Mexico 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2006), 4. 
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sample. She frequently used descriptive, creative writing to generate a dystopian image 
describing victims of pollution. Weiser also criticized those she believed guilty of 
environmental transgressions, often listing the names of polluting corporations in her 
stories. Fernando Césarman was a psychoanalyst, ecologist, environmentalist, writer, 
editor, and columnist who made frequent contributions to Uno Más Uno promoting 
environmentalism. Like Weiser, Césarman used creative writing to persuade readers of 
the dangers of pollution and the need for meaningful government action, but his style was 
less confrontational in that he did not name names. Instead, Césarman’s writings 
encouraged Mexicans to recognize the importance of a clean environment and to do what 
they could to help improve environmental conditions across the country. Raul Olmedo 
was a political scientist specializing in public administration who wrote editorials for his 
column called “La Crisis” for Excélsior from 1977 through 1984.9 He wrote about 
Mexican policies and, in January 1984, included a lengthy series on the state of Mexico’s 
forestry industry. Olmedo generally supported the ruling party’s plans for forestry 
development and used his column to convince readers of the efficacy of government 
policy. The writing styles of these three journalists, and those of all the others included in 
this sample, showcase the diverse perspectives environmental reporters contributed to the 
many environmental narratives competing for the attention of Excélsior and Uno Más 
Uno readers. 
Because Excélsior and Uno Más Uno were national papers, their reporters 
covered environmental issues spanning the diverse terrain, climates, and ecosystems 
                                                 
9 1977 was the year after Excélsior became a government-friendly paper and the year that Olmedo 
started writing for it. 
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across all of Mexico. The Baja California peninsula extends for 775 miles along the west 
coast, and is typified by arid deserts and rugged mountains, except for the far north where 
coastal cities like Tijuana and Ensenada experience a Mediterranean climate similar to 
southern California. The rest of northern Mexico is defined by two major mountain 
ranges, the Sierra Madre Occidental which rises in Sonora along the Arizona border and 
parallels the Pacific coast south to Jalisco, and the Sierra Madre Oriental which rises in 
Coahuila near the Texas border and runs southeast to Veracruz. Both of these ranges 
collect enough moisture due to their higher elevations to support vast temperate forests of 
deciduous and coniferous trees, but the lower elevations near the two ranges are marked 
by hot deserts whose cities frequently suffered from water shortages in the early 1980s. 
The exception to this are the lowlands east of the Sierra Madre Oriental, where ample 
moisture from the Gulf of Mexico supports the northernmost tropical rainforest in the 
Americas, the Huasteca in northern Veracruz and southern Tamaulipas. 
The Sierra Madre ranges run into the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt, which 
extends along an east-west axis from Jalisco to southern Veracruz encompassing the 
traditional heartland of Mexican society. This is the most populous region of the country, 
with large cities like Guadalajara, Mexico City, and Puebla lying in high-elevation basins 
and valleys surrounded by the even higher volcanic peaks that extend throughout the 
region. The Valley of Mexico (technically an endorheic basin that now has a manmade 
outlet to the Gulf of Mexico via the Tula and Pánuco Rivers) dominates this region both 
politically and demographically – although it only occupies 0.03 percent of Mexico’s 
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territory, it was home to twenty-three percent of its population in the early 1980s.10 At 
more than 7,000 feet above sea level, the Valley of Mexico also serves as the headwaters 
for many of central Mexico’s major rivers. Due to the industrial runoff and lack of 
sewage treatment from a metropolis with thirteen million people, these rivers were 
severely polluted right from their sources in the early 1980s. The climate in the Trans-
Mexican Volcanic Belt is typified by wet summers and dry winters. Air pollution can be 
especially bad here in the winter season when stagnant temperature inversions trap 
pollutants in these valleys and basins. The mountains of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt 
historically held vast temperate forests similar to those of the Sierra Madres, but centuries 
of forest harvesting had left much of this region eroded and degraded by the early 
1980s.11 
Southern Mexico is marked by a transition from temperate forests to tropical 
forests. The Sierra Madre del Sur branches off of the Trans-Mexican Volcanic Belt, 
running through Michoacán, Guerrero, and Oaxaca before tapering off at the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec. This range is typified by temperate forests in higher elevations and dry 
tropical forests in lower elevations. On the eastern side of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, 
the Sierra Madre de Chiapas rises in the state of Chiapas and continues southeast into 
Central America. The Lancandon rainforest grows along the northern slopes of the Sierra 
Madre de Chiapas and continues north into the southern Yucatan Peninsula. The 
                                                 
10 Exequiel Ezcurra, “The Basin of Mexico,” in The Earth as Transformed by Human Action: 
Global and Regional Changes in the Biosphere over the Past 300 Years ed. B.L. Turner II, William C. 
Clark, Robert W. Kates, John F. Richards, Jessica T. Mathews, and William B. Mayer (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), 577. 
11 Ibid, 580-81. 
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Lancandon experienced rapid deforestation for much of the twentieth century due to 
logging corporations, and to a smaller extent, slash-and-burn agriculture.12 The heavy, 
drenching rains of this region easily wash away the poor tropical soils of deforested 
areas, which means that once the jungle is gone it is nearly impossible to reestablish.13 
The northern Yucatan Peninsula is marked by flat, karst topography, with dry tropical 
rainforest. Many news stories in this thesis’s sample cover deforestation and erosion 
problems in the forests of Oaxaca, the Lancandon rain forest, and the dry tropical forests 
of the Yucatan. 
While Mexican environments may be quite diverse, in this thesis, Mexican 
environmentalism is defined rather narrowly. When this thesis uses the term “Mexican 
environmentalism,” it refers to any Mexican articulation of concern for: 1) the ecological 
health of an environment or any species thereof; 2) the health of people living in an 
environment in which the resources needed for life are contaminated; and 3) the quality 
or quantity of a natural resource deemed important to the national economy. While others 
may define Mexican environmentalism differently based on the period and sources under 
research, this definition derives from the pattern of environmental discussions structured 
and shaped by Mexican reporters and their sources in 1983 and 1984 in the two 
newspapers used for this thesis. 
                                                 
12 For insight into the extent of the damage and how it has altered the cultures of its residents see: 
Lourdes Arizpe, Fernanda Paz, and Margarita Velázquez, Culture and Global Change: Social Perceptions 
of Deforestation in the Lancandona Rain Forest in Mexico (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 
1996). 
13 Perhaps no one has explained more eloquently the vulnerability of tropical rain forests to 
deforestation than Warren Dean, see: Warren Dean, With Broadax and Firebrand: The Destruction of the 
Brazilian Atlantic Forest (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 4-5. 
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Mexican environmentalism fits in with a recent wave of environmentalism, one in 
which the meaning of the word is acutely tied to contamination and pollution in ways that 
earlier articulations were not. Lane Simonian defined this Mexican environmentalism in 
Defending the Land of the Jaguar, describing the environmental movement there as first 
and foremost an attempt to prevent pollution from making people sick.14 Recent 
American environmental historians have expanded the connection between pollution and 
people, linking environmental contaminants and human bodies in increasingly intimate 
and scary ways.15 Civic environmental action centered around advocacy for causes like 
safe drinking water, breathable air, industrial accountability, and the protection of soil for 
peasant farmers. These were the issues that propelled Mexican environmental reporters to 
action. 
The environmental reporting of the early 1980s arose in a larger political context 
shaped largely by the course of Mexican history in the decades following the Mexican 
Revolution (1910-1920). Many different factions fought for political control of Mexico 
both during and after the Revolution, with frequent assassinations throughout the period. 
In 1929, former President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928) established a political party 
that would become Mexico’s ruling party for the rest of the century, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, or PRI.16 The new party succeeded in appropriating the social ideals 
                                                 
14 Simonian. 203-18. 
15 See: Christopher C. Sellers, Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease to Environmental 
Health Science (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Linda Nash, Inescapable 
Ecologies: A History of Environment, Disease, and Knowledge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2007); Nancy Langston, Toxic Bodies: Hormone Disruptors and the Legacy of DES (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2010). 
16 The PRI had different names in its early years. Calles called it the National Revolutionary Party 
(PNR). President Lázaro Cárdenas renamed it the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938. 
President Miguel Ávila Camacho gave the party its current name in 1946.  
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of the Revolution during the 1930s, effectively returning political stability to Mexico.17 
One of its more popular policies was to establish ejidos, land held communally by 
peasants for use by the community from generation to generation. The party consolidated 
its hegemony during the economic boom known as the Mexican Miracle (1940-1970), in 
which the PRI’s policies of import substitution and industrialization sustained a period of 
impressive economic growth. The PRI had an authoritarian streak, however, and party 
leaders often conducted violence against Mexicans who demonstrated against the party in 
the mid-twentieth century. But most Mexicans enjoyed the thriving economy and social 
benefits seemingly guaranteed by the PRI, so the ranks of dissenters remained small 
enough that PRI leaders could effectively repress them or buy compliance by 
redistributing income and resources plentiful in the booming economy.18 
The PRI started to lose hegemony in the 1970s due to a combination of social 
protest and mounting economic crisis, a process that accelerated in the 1980s. The 
Mexican economy cooled off during the global 1970s recession, but money from large oil 
reserves discovered in Veracruz and Tabasco in 1976 helped to mask many of Mexico’s 
systemic economic problems.19 Wishing to avoid foreign ownership of Mexican 
resources, the PRI had nationalized many of Mexico’s industries in the 1930s and 1940s, 
but this lack of competition often gave rise to unproductive, inefficient companies funded 
                                                 
17 Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, “Strongmen and State Weakness,” in Dicta Blanda: Politics, 
Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938-1968, ed. Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2014), 120. 
18 Jo Tuckman, Mexico: Democracy Interrupted (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 14. 
19 Brian R. Hamnett, A Concise History of Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 262. 
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and run by the federal government.20 President José López Portillo unwisely leveraged 
this new anticipated oil revenue to acquire numerous foreign loans with high interest 
rates in order to keep the bloated federal government funded.21  In 1981 the price of oil 
plummeted, and Mexico could no longer meet its loan payment obligations. From 1983 
through 1988 about seven percent of the nation’s gross national product went to servicing 
the debt, more than what Mexico spent on education and health services combined.22 
Harvard-educated economic technocrat Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado (1982-1988) 
assumed the presidency amidst this economic crisis, and started embracing neoliberal 
reforms as a way to decrease government expenditures and increase foreign capital 
infusion. De la Madrid’s new neoliberal state brought flexible labor market laws, cuts in 
social welfare programs, and increased privatization.23 These changes, pushed by foreign 
lenders in the United States and Europe, allowed Miguel de la Madrid to reschedule debt 
payments, but the austerity measures left many millions of impoverished Mexicans 
without a social safety net of support. Ejidos, with their land and resources restricted 
from sale by the need for community consensus, were threatened by the move to 
privatization, and many government-friendly reporters in this thesis’s sample described 
them as backwards and unproductive. While Mexican neoliberalism was in its infancy in 
1983 and 1984, several articles among the sample covered in this thesis demonstrate how 
                                                 
20 Ibid, 241, 263. 
21 Ibid, 266. 
22 Alicia Hernández Chávez, Mexico: A Brief History, trans. Andy Klatt (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 308. 
23 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29. 
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the federal government was trying to implement the privatization of Mexican forests and 
promote the policy as environmentally-friendly. 
As De la Madrid’s government debated the future of Mexico’s economic policies 
in 1983 and 1984, most Mexicans were simply trying to survive the present economic 
slump. Many scholars have argued that the economic collapse of 1982 provoked the loss 
of long-held single-party PRI hegemony over Mexico and sparked the rise of autonomous 
civic action groups opposing government policy on a number of issues, including the 
environment.24 Voices of opposition to the PRI started to play a significant role in the 
national conversation, and the kinds of stories told by environmental reporters reflect this 
change. In short, Mexicans lost confidence in the federal government’s ability to manage 
Mexico, and autonomous social movements and non-governmental organizations 
challenged the government’s role as sole guarantor of social justice. 
In response to these non-governmental environmental actors, President De la 
Madrid launched a campaign to convince Mexicans that the federal government was both 
cognizant of environmental problems and proactive in addressing them.25 Stephen 
Mumme labeled this effort “preemptive reform,” arguing that the primary motive for 
                                                 
24 See for example: Jordi Díez, Political Change and Environmental Policymaking in Mexico 
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 13; Paul Lawrence Haber, Power From Experience: Urban Popular 
Movements in Late Twentieth-Century Mexico (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2006), 62; Neil Harvey, “The Difficult Transition: Neoliberalism and Neocorporatism in Mexico,” in 
Mexico: Dilemmas of Transition, ed. Neil Harvey (London: British Academic Press, 1993), 4;  Hughes, 7; 
Oscar J. Martínez, Troublesome Border (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 110; Stephen P. 
Mumme, “System Maintenance and Environmental Reform in Mexico: Salinas’s Preemptive Strategy,” 
Latin American Perspectives 19, no. 1 (1992): 125. 
25 This phenomenon of environmental groups forcing environmental issues into the public and 
political arena is not limited to Mexico. For more discussion of the relationship between non-governmental 
environmental organizations, media, and the government, see: Alison Anderson, “Source-Media Relations: 
The Production of the Environmental Agenda,” in The Mass Media and Environmental Issues, ed. Anders 
Hansen (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), 62. 
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embracing environmentalism was to head-off any non-governmental environmental 
action that might lead to government criticism or protests.26 Upon assuming office in 
1982 De la Madrid created Mexico’s first environmental protection ministry, SEDUE. In 
the summer of 1983 he met with President Ronald Reagan in Baja California to sign an 
environmental protection border agreement with the United States. Furthermore, 
President Miguel de la Madrid devised, and then spoke before the first National 
Environmental Congress, held in Mexico City in June 1984. It is against this backdrop 
that the environmental reporters of 1983 and 1984 wrote their stories and shaped their 
environmental narratives. 
Several authors have discussed the environmental crises and subsequent rise of 
civic environmental action in Mexico in the 1980s, but unfortunately, most of them have 
neglected to incorporate the important role of the newspaper into their argument. Many 
Mexican and American ecologists, environmental sociologists, economists, and historians 
have argued that the massive population growth of the Valley of Mexico in the second 
half of the twentieth century gave rise to many environmental problems both inside and 
outside the valley.27 Mexican scholars Enrique Torres Lopez, Mario A. Santoscoy, José 
Luis Lezama, and Victor Alejandro Payá Porres have described spontaneous urban 
uprisings or demonstrations as responses to these serious environmental threats to the 
health of the citizens.28 Several historians and political scientists have argued that 
                                                 
26 Mumme, 127-128. 
27 Ezcurra, 577-588; Luis Lezama, 23; Ortiz Monasterio, 231-34; Joel Simon, Endangered 
Mexico: An Environment on the Edge (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997), 77-90; Garza Villarreal, 
269; Beatriz A. Albores Zárate, Tules y sirenas: el impacto ecológico y cultural de la industrialización en 
el Alto Lerma (Zinacantepec: El Colegio Mexiquense, A.C., 1995), 368-369. 
28 Enrique Torres Lopez and Mario A. Santoscoy, La historia del agua en Monterrey: Desde 1577 
hasta 1985 (Monterrey: Castillo, 1985), 89-91; José Luis Lezama, “Metropolitan Environmental 
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government attempts to channel these environmental movements into official state 
structures, Mumme’s “preemptive reform,” only encouraged further nongovernmental 
environmental advocacy.29 Sallie Hughes and Lane Simonian have suggested the 
important role newspapers played in propelling this movement forward, but neither of 
them attempted a thorough historical analysis of environmental newspaper reporting.30 In 
1983 and 1984, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno directors viewed environmental issues as 
popular enough to warrant frequent column space. Their efforts to sell newspapers with 
environmental issues exposed a diversity of environmental narratives to the reading 
public. In analyzing these narratives, this thesis presents a clearer understanding of the 
specific strategies those involved with environmental issues employed in order to 
compete for public attention among the many environmental narratives on display in 
Mexico’s newspapers. 
Water crises, forests, and air pollution were the top three most discussed topics in 
the sample of papers used for this thesis, and therefore make up its three chapters.31 Aside 
from being important simply because they were the most discussed issues, water crises, 
forests, and air pollution had social relevance. Mexico City in the 1980s suffered from the 
world’s worst air pollution and it worsened throughout the decade. Many other cities like 
                                                 
Management: The Case of Air Pollution in the Valle de México,” in Population, City, and Environment in 
Contemporary Mexico, ed. José Luis Lezama and José B. Morelos (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 
2006), 505; Victor Alejando Payá Porres, Laguna Verde: La Violencia de la Modernización: Actores y 
Movimiento Social (México City: Instituto Mora, 1994), 73-75. 
29 Díez, 30; Velma García-Gorena, Mothers and the Mexican Antinuclear Power Movement 
(Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1999), 17-18; Mumme, 125. 
30 Hughes, 4-6; Simonian, 205.  
31 Of the 216 newspaper articles researched, sixty-two discussed water crises (twenty-nine 
percent), forty-three discussed forests (twenty percent), and twenty-eight discussed air pollution (thirteen 
percent). Other popular topics included twenty-two stories about agricultural issues and eighteen stories 
about problems with oil. See Table 1 in the appendix for more detail. 
17 
 
 
 
Coatzacoalcos in the south and Ensenada in the north also suffered from unhealthy air. 
The first chapter explores the narrative surrounding air pollution – which groups took 
part in the discussion, how they explained the dangers, and who they tried to blame for 
creating it. The analysis reveals a national debate over culpability and government 
policies as well as concern for human health. 
Chapter 2 transitions from the smoggy cities to the deforested countryside, where 
environmental protection advocates tried to quantify the damage while sustainable 
logging promoters argued over the best way to extract more wealth from Mexico’s 
forests. Here the national narrative centered around finding a way to use forest resources 
in a way that did not lead to environmental crisis, even as rampant deforestation left large 
swaths of the country ecologically damaged and agriculturally unproductive. 
Deforestation wreaked havoc on ecosystems, farmland, rivers, and the campesinos who 
depended on the health of all of these elements for their subsistence. As the destruction of 
Mexico’s forests accelerated in the early 1980s, the federal government introduced a new 
forest policy that encouraged the privatization of forest resources, and newspapers reveal 
efforts by the federal government to convince Mexicans that this policy was the right 
move.32 
Chapter 3 examines the national narrative surrounding water pollution and water 
shortages. Millions lacked access to clean water, and were subjected to frequent 
outbreaks of water-borne diseases affecting tens of thousands. These water crises proved 
to be the most acute environmental threat. Mexicans were much more likely to die from 
                                                 
32 Christopher R. Boyer, Political Landscapes: Forests, Conservation, and Community in Mexico 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 232. 
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water contaminated with sewage or industrial waste than from any other form of 
pollution.33 In addition, many regions of the country faced water shortages in 1983 and 
1984 which threatened their economic prosperity.34 Newspapers carried the efforts by 
many different social groups to describe the problems, to blame those they believed 
guilty for causing them, and to present reasons why those who had access to clean water 
should care. 
The frequency with which environmental stories appeared in these two Mexican 
newspapers throughout 1983 and 1984 reflects both the severity of the environmental 
crises facing the nation and the loss of faith in the federal government to address it. Even 
many who did not define themselves as environmentalists took part in the battle to 
control the narrative evolving in the newspapers in an attempt to secure access to clean 
water and air. Newspaper reporters led the way in pressuring the federal government to 
respond to environmental problems. Sometimes these responses resulted in a cleaner 
environment, such as the reduction in air pollution over the Valley of Mexico starting in 
the 1980s, and dramatically improving in the early 1990s. In other cases, government-
friendly reporters merely tried to put an environmental spin on policies the PRI wanted to 
implement anyway, such as the campaign in the 1980s to describe the privatization of 
forests as an environmentally-friendly action. That reporters mentioned the environment 
at all is a testament to the penetration of environmental advocacy within Mexican society 
                                                 
33 Fernando Ortiz Monasterio, Tierra profanada: historia ambiental de México (México, D.F.: 
Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología, 1987), 249. 
34 Gustavo Garza Villarreal, El proceso de industrialización en la ciudad de México (1821-1970) 
(México D.F.: El Colegio de Méxcio, 1985), 269; Ortiz Monasterio, 236. 
19 
 
 
 
in the 1980s, a process that newspapers facilitated and sustained. The drive to clean up 
the air was one of the most successful, and so this thesis begins there. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“We Would Flee to the Mountains Desperately Looking for Breathable Air”: 
Excélsior, Uno Más Uno, and the Battle for Clean Air  
 
In April 1984, award-winning Mexican author Fernando Césarman wrote an 
editorial condemning the lack of government action to effectively deal with Mexico 
City’s chronic air pollution. He noted that the city did not need special scientific 
equipment in order to see how bad the problem had become; the smog was plainly visible 
with the naked eye. Yet, Césarman observed, most people went about their lives just the 
same, everyday inhaling the dangerous chemicals while doing nothing to fight for cleaner 
air. In order to convince readers of the absurdity of this situation, Césarman proposed a 
thought experiment, “If the air typical of the region was more clear, and we awoke one 
morning to suddenly find the gray cloud of smog, the shock would be of such magnitude 
that we would either not come out of our houses or we would flee to the mountains 
desperately looking for breathable air.”35 Césarman argued that the slow increase of air 
pollution over the years permitted Mexicans to become accustomed to it, and this is what 
allowed for such complacency in the face of a deadly threat. 
                                                 
35 Fernando Césarman, "El lento aumento del neblumo," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), 
Apr. 9, 1984. 
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The doom and gloom in Césarman’s style was not unusual among Mexican 
reporters covering air quality throughout the 1980s, and journalists had reason to be 
concerned. Air quality was especially poor in the Valley of Mexico where a combination 
of topography, climatology, and shortsighted national development policies had given 
rise to an environmental nightmare. Mexico City lies in a large basin surrounded by high 
mountain ranges that hinder the dispersal of air to surrounding regions. Furthermore, 
thermal inversions – in which a cooler layer of air at the surface becomes trapped below a 
more stable, warmer layer above – typically occur in the valley more than 250 days a 
year. The Valley of Mexico’s location ensures that regions of high pressure – typified by 
dry, sunny days and light winds – dominate the city’s weather pattern. Finally, the 
valley’s 7,380 foot elevation means there is twenty three percent less oxygen in the air 
than exists at sea level, which causes combustion engines to burn less efficiently, thereby 
releasing more pollutants into the atmosphere.36 Policies aimed at centralizing industry 
brought government and commerce into the Valley of Mexico in the decades after the 
Revolution. Mexican political leaders encouraged a prodigious population increase in the 
valley, which grew from nearly three million in 1950 to thirteen million by 1980.37 As the 
number of vehicles (more than two million in 1980) and industrial complexes increased 
in the valley, Mexico City residents soon found themselves inhaling some of the world’s 
most unhealthy air.38 However, air pollution was not limited to the Valley of Mexico. 
Cities in the northwest, like Ensenada, Baja California, also suffered from inversions that 
                                                 
36 José Luis Lezama, Medio ambiente, sociedad y gobierno: La cuestión institucional (México, 
D.F.: El Colegio de México, 2006), 24. 
37 Lezama, 23. 
38 Lezama, 85. 
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trapped air pollutants for long periods of time. In Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, in southeast 
Mexico, a large oil refining industry ensured that skies stayed polluted no matter what the 
weather did. 
Mexican journalists churned out reports on air quality more frequently than 
reports on erosion, pesticide risks, or the depletion of natural resources. Unlike these 
other crises, urban Mexicans of all social classes experienced air pollution in a very 
tangible way; they awoke to its smell in the morning, their sinuses burned and their eyes 
watered as they inhaled industrial particulate emissions, and many suffered from pinkeye 
infections just from going outside. 
Throughout 1983 and 1984, Uno Más Uno and Excélsior reporters published 
news stories and editorials on air pollution that generally presented one or more of the 
following approaches: blaming poor air quality on a specific group; linking air pollution 
with other phenomena such as poor health or deforestation; or applauding government 
efforts to improve air quality. The quantity and content of these stories suggests that 
Mexican journalists were concerned about the dangers poor air quality posed. 
Furthermore, the frequent blaming of Mexico’s government and industry for air pollution 
suggests that many reporters viewed their own society as broken and incapable of 
addressing serious problems surrounding public health. Meanwhile, in the very same 
newspapers, government administrators exuded confidence in the government’s ability to 
improve the nation’s air quality, thus providing readers with an alternative environmental 
narrative. News stories from this sample, then, demonstrate that most reporters covering 
air pollution served as public watchdogs and educators, but about twenty percent worked 
to deflect criticism aimed at the federal government and to promote policies supported by 
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the PRI. Furthermore, the reporters who played the roles of watchdog and educator 
placed Mexico’s air pollution in the spotlight, pressuring government administrators to 
finally take meaningful action to improve air quality in the 1990s. 
The rest of this chapter will be divided into three sections that analyze the tactics 
of reporters serving as watchdogs, educators, and government defenders. “Affixing 
Blame” examines the watchdog role environmental reporters and various sources played, 
and the tactics they used to shame polluters and pollution-enablers into action. “Linking 
Air Pollution with Other Problems” examines the educator role reporters and their 
sources played in making connections between air pollution and other phenomena like 
human and ecological health problems. “The Government is the Solution” analyzes those 
reporters and government administrators who presented an alternative air pollution 
narrative in Mexico’s newspapers, one in which President De la Madrid and his priístas 
were already leading Mexico to an environmentally friendly future.39 
Affixing Blame 
By blaming different entities for Mexico’s air pollution and explaining the 
physical characteristics that contributed to it, reporters helped Mexican readers 
understand why their air was so unhealthy and thus provided figures on which Mexicans 
could focus their anger. For example, journalist Teresa Weiser described the existence of 
a garbage dump on the periphery of Mexico City as such: “the authorities have set up an 
enormous landfill at the foot of La Caldera hill, on the edge of the highway, whose filth is 
                                                 
39 Because Mexico’s government was so thoroughly dominated by one political party in 1983-
1984, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), I consider the terms “federal government” and “PRI” to 
be interchangeable and will treat them as such throughout this chapter. Priístas is a Spanish word that 
means supporters of the PRI. 
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dispersed in a radius of hundreds of meters and passers-by breathe in a fermented stench 
that warns visitors that they have arrived in Mexico City.”40 In this case Weiser blamed 
the foul air emanating from the garbage dump on the government, but other stories 
highlighted different guilty figures. The complexity of understanding all of the various 
factors that contributed to air pollution – such as industrial emissions, automobile 
exhaust, government policies, and weather patterns – ensured that most Mexicans could 
not untangle the mix of variables that made their air dangerous to breathe. Environmental 
reporters brought order to this tangled web, usually focusing on only one or two variables 
per story, which enabled readers to acquire knowledge about the problem story by story, 
rather than overwhelming them with too much information at once. By assigning blame, 
reporters also gave readers a focal point for their anger, which sometimes manifested 
itself in the form of civil demonstrations. Naming those responsible for air pollution 
exposed these entities to public ridicule and empowered Mexican readers through 
education. 
Mexico’s industries proved to be popular targets among environmental reporters, 
and they typically couched their stories in one of two ways: general blaming, or blaming, 
naming, and shaming. Many articles blamed industry in general for air pollution and 
drew links between emissions and environmental or human health problems. Others 
published lists of specific corporations or industrial complexes in an attempt to shame 
them or the government into action. While articles falling into the general blaming 
category helped readers understand why air pollution was a problem, articles that also 
                                                 
40 Teresa Weiser, "Desastre ecológico y urbano en gran parte de la zona oriente del Valle," Uno 
Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), June 25, 1984. 
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named and shamed the perpetrators confronted the problem in a very direct manner, 
giving readers the knowledge needed to take a stand for clean air, should they choose to 
do so. 
Javier Cruz A. filed a story for Excélsior in September 1983, reporting in the 
general blaming style. He explained that industrial waste contaminated both the air and 
the water in Ensenada, Baja California, and that between ten and fifteen percent of the 
city’s population suffered from respiratory or eye illnesses due to gases and powders 
from nearby industries. Cruz used the story’s byline to focus attention on the scope of the 
problem, writing, “Every Day Some 30,000 Ensenadans Breathe in Gases and Dust 
Spewed by Factories.”41 While the story noted that the persistence of thermal inversions 
contributed to poor air quality – a problem in this coastal state as well as in the Valley of 
Mexico – Cruz accentuated the role played by Ensenada’s industries, rather than the 
climate, in perpetuating the city’s suffering. 
An unnamed author published an article with a similar sentiment toward industrial 
pollution for Uno Más Uno, evincing a sense of hopelessness and anger with which many 
Mexican readers must have identified. The author wrote of a nationwide problem: “In 
Mexico, not only do the foreign-owned corporations pollute, but so do the domestic ones, 
and their harmful effects result in serious deterioration of the air…The lack of control and 
respect to the rules of emission and environmental quality enable industries to release 
their pollutants with minimal fear of being sanctioned even though transnational 
                                                 
41 Javier Cruz A., “Grave contaminación causan varias industrias en Ensenada,” Excélsior 
(Mexico City, Mexico), Sep. 26, 1983. 
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corporations have been expelled from other countries for these causes.”42 In noting the 
“lack of control and respect to the rules of emission,” the author also implicated the 
government in looking the other way rather than enforcing air quality regulations. In this 
article, industry and government were partners in crime, and everyone in the Valley of 
Mexico suffered from their corruption. Furthermore, the author compared Mexico 
unfavorably with other nations in terms of environmental protection by noting that other 
countries had the fortitude to remove offending transnational polluters from their borders 
while even Mexican companies did not seem to care about Mexico’s environment. 
Some reporters and sources took things a step further, targeting not just industry 
in general, but rather blaming, naming, and shaming specific industrial plants and 
corporations that polluted the air. In a story for Excélsior Mario Ruiz R. named twelve 
industries in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, that released their untreated industrial waste into 
the air and rivers of the city.43 The author claimed that area residents suffered from 
respiratory and gastrointestinal problems due to the pollution released by these industries. 
Seven months later, Uno Más Uno published a similar story, in which co-authors Teresa 
Weiser and Jesús Lastra named specific industrial plants and corporations polluting 
Coatzacoalcos: “The atmospheric pollution comes from a multitude of industrial plants 
concentrated in this area and in order to give an idea of the magnitude of the smoke and 
                                                 
42 La ciudad de México, una de las urbes más contaminadas del mundo,” Uno Más Uno (Mexico 
City, Mexico), May 25, 1984. 
43 Mario Ruiz R., “Pasividad de las autoridades federales,” Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Sep. 
12, 1983, here is a list of the companies cited by the author: Pemex, Tetraetilo de México, Cloro de 
Tehuantepec, Industrias Quimicas del Istmo, Celanese Mexicana, Industrias Resistol, Fertimex, 
Fenoquimia, Tereftalatos, Azufrera Panamericana Liquid Carbonic, Temsa, and Iquisa. 
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gases they emit, here is a list of the major factories…”44 Weiser and Lastra then listed 
thirteen factories, six of which were also listed by Mario Ruiz R. The authors detailed the 
environmental damage caused by this pollution. They also included a picture of a 
residential neighborhood in the foreground with thick black smoke in the background 
filling the horizon. Perhaps because Coatzacoalcos is 600 kilometers from Mexico City 
(where Uno Más Uno was published) the authors felt the need to include visual evidence 
of the environmental destruction occurring in this important port city. 
Whereas Mexico’s ruling party, the PRI, had responded to criticism with 
cooption, repression, or violence for most of its existence, in the 1980s a cascade of crises 
in Mexico emboldened critics. From runaway inflation and a sagging economy, to 
environmental issues like air pollution, journalists started challenging the official party 
line in increasing numbers in a plea for greater democracy.45 Journalists like Weiser and 
Lastra used many techniques – reporting on the ecological damage, including visual 
evidence of pollution, and describing the health impacts on local residents – to gain the 
moral authority needed to stand in judgment of Mexico’s industry and government, 
                                                 
44 Teresa Weiser and Jesús Lastra, “Desastre ecológico en Coatzacoalcos por la elevada 
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45 For a further examination into the shifting variations of authoritarianism over time in twentieth-
century Mexico see Víctor Alejandro Payá Porres, Laguna Verde: La violencia de la modernización: 
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which they leveraged into a public shaming undertaken by naming the perpetrators in the 
newspaper. 
By interviewing them, reporters shared the watchdog role with their sources, 
giving them a platform from which they could blame industries or corporations for 
fouling the air. For example, in a story concerning air pollution in the eastern Valley of 
Mexico, Teresa Weiser interviewed Eréndira Espinoza, a spokesperson from the 
Committee of Ecological Preservation at the National School of Professional Studies – 
Zaragoza, who took aim at a nearby industrial plant: “We see the inhabitants of the Army 
of the East housing unit affected by the acute pollution recorded in the area, principally 
by the Minerales No Metálicos factory [located 12.5 kilometers away] which twenty-four 
hours a day emits all kinds of substances and dust with serious effects on the health of the 
population.”46 In linking gases and dust emitted by Minerales No Metálicos with skin, 
eye, and respiratory tract damage among nearby residents, Espinoza hoped to bring 
negative attention to this particular factory. 
By 1983, Mexico’s nationalized oil industry, Pemex, had essentially become an 
autonomous branch of the government, with few regulations and a horrendous 
environmental record.47 So when two academics criticized Pemex’s March 18 Refinery in 
an Excélsior story, they were also criticizing the government.48 A 1983 study undertaken 
                                                 
46 Teresa Weiser, “Desastre ecológico y urbano en gran parte de la zona oriente del Valle,” Uno 
Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), June 25, 1984. 
47 Joel Simon, Endangered Mexico: An Environment on the Edge (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books, 1997), 158-59. 
48 The refinery took its name from March 18, 1938, a proud date in Mexican history on which 
President Lázaro Cárdenas expropriated the nation’s oil, marking the start of a government-run petroleum 
industry. 
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by New York University concluded that Azcapotzalco, Mexico (also in the Valley of 
Mexico), had the second worst polluted air in the world. In response, reporter Juan G. 
Reyes interviewed two faculty members at Metropolitan Autonomous University (UAM) 
– Azcapotzalco to ask them why. Yolanda Falcón Briseño, from the university’s Energy 
Department, blamed Pemex’s March 18 Refinery, and suggested that it was a poor 
decision to build an oil refinery in the Valley of Mexico. Ruth Alvarado, the director of 
ecological projects at the university, also criticized this government-run industry: “Pemex 
should shelve its publicity campaigns as this money would be better spent taking 
measures that truly help to prevent pollution.”49  Both academics felt compelled to blame 
Pemex for the air pollution, even though doing so risked embarrassing an authoritarian 
regime. 
Many environmental reporters confronted government policymakers more 
directly, calling out the corruption, cronyism, and poor decisions that gave rise to 
Mexico’s world-famous air pollution. In general, these criticisms fell into two categories: 
bad government administrators, or bad government policies. Stories focusing on the 
former drew attention to government inaction or corruption. Journalists harped on the 
lack of effective measures for mitigating air pollution and traced this problem back to 
local, state, and federal government administrators. Other reporters focused on specific 
government policies that encouraged air pollution, or even worse, actively created it. 
Juan Gerardo Reyes called attention to carcinogenic chemicals in the air, noting 
how they are especially dangerous to infants, thereby drawing a tangible link between 
                                                 
49 Juan G. Reyes, “Ocupa México el segundo lugar entre los países más contaminados,” Excélsior 
(Mexico City, Mexico), Oct. 13, 1983. 
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government officials and diseases afflicting Mexicans and their children. In a report for 
Excélsior, Reyes explained, “Mexico City’s air pollution had already passed the limits 
that humans can tolerate without danger,” and that, “furthermore, the measures 
implemented up to this point to combat air pollution are insufficient, and frequently 
remain mere projects, due to changes of government and the neglect of some 
authorities.”50 With his story, Reyes accused government authorities of failing in their 
duties to protect Mexicans from poisonous pollutants. As noted in the Introduction, 
Excélsior was a government-friendly newspaper, but Reyes’s criticism demonstrates that 
Excélsior’s support of the PRI was merely a trend, not a rule. 
In a story written by Teresa Weiser, Dr. Humberto Bravo, director of the 
Department of Environmental Pollution at the Center for Atmospheric Sciences at the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), criticized lawmakers for failing to 
establish clear standards for air quality. He explained that without standards there was no 
way to quantify levels of atmospheric pollutants such as carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, 
lead, and ozone. Weiser delved into the details with Dr. Bravo, providing readers with the 
numerical percentages specific pollutants constituted in Mexico City’s atmosphere and 
what safe levels were, but her role as public watchdog was evident in the headline: 
“Deficient and inadequate: the air quality standards of the law to protect the 
environment.”51 While Weiser’s article was full of scientific facts and figures for readers 
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Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Oct. 13, 1983. 
51 Teresa Weiser, “Deficientes e inadecuadas, las normas de calidad del aire de la ley de 
protección del ambiente,” Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), June 1, 1984. 
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interested in the data, her headline summarized the underlying message – your 
government legislators are not doing enough to protect your air.  
In other situations, reporters did not merely accuse government administrators of 
neglect, but rather asserted that government policies actively made air quality worse; 
Teresa Weiser used this approach a month after her story on the lack of air quality 
standards to cover the source of widespread E. coli infections in the Valley of Mexico. 
On the valley’s east side, near Nezahualcóyotl, there existed a large seasonal lake called 
Xochiaca that consisted primarily of sewage. Every dry season the lake evaporated, 
allowing the prevailing winds to carry dust and E. coli bacteria into the Valley of Mexico 
where people breathed it in, suffering respiratory infections as a result. Weiser 
interviewed Jorge Paulat, who helped create the Health System for Nezahualcóyotl and 
revealed some unsettling information about Xochiaca’s origins. Paulat said that starting 
in the late 1950s, government administrators of the Federal District (comparable to the 
District of Columbia in the United States) decided the basin was a convenient place to 
dump sewage from the city when other sewage channels proved insufficient. 
Furthermore, he claimed that authorities found Xochiaca to be a cheap and effective 
deterrent to the construction of new slums. He explained that Mexico City “is the only 
great human concentration where they [government administrators] not only allowed, but 
rather created an infectious lagoon of the magnitude of Xochiaca.”52 To help bring this 
cesspool to life for her readers, Weiser included three large pictures showing the lake 
filled with trash. She also used her descriptive writing skills to connect government 
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decisions with this lake of filth: “A foul odor announces its presence from kilometers 
away, and once it comes into view, the panorama is bleak. Amongst some green aquatic 
plants that manage to reproduce in this lagoon of sewage, the waste stands out: tires, 
bottles, plastic bags, diapers, and excrement float, defining an enormous and nauseating 
scum. At the same time, clouds of flies and mosquitos proliferate along its banks where, 
on the other side, and separated only by the asphalt ribbon for a large median, hundreds 
of children play soccer.”53 The article concludes with Paulat’s claim that the government 
could drain Xochiaca in less than fifteen days, and convert the space into a park or 
recreation complex to impede new settlement. By including this revelation, Weiser 
reinforces the notion that this is a fixable problem, and that government policy is the only 
barrier to a cleaner environment. 
Teresa Weiser also employed subtler tactics to undermine government legitimacy 
on environmental issues, as her coverage of Mexico’s first National Environmental 
Congress demonstrates. When President Miguel de la Madrid spoke before the Congress 
in June 1984, he called on the Mexican people to change their ways. The President noted 
that each day every Mexican contributed to the improvement or deterioration of the 
environment, so the government needed to promote an ecological conscience among the 
people. Of course the amount of pollution emitted by government-run industries, like 
Pemex, or poorly regulated private industries contributed a much larger share of the 
nation’s pollution than each individual Mexican, but Miguel de la Madrid spun the 
nation’s environmental crisis: “The responsibility…belongs to the whole community, 
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certainly the government, but also to each and every Mexican.”54 The President, and 
following government speakers, went on to discuss all the bureaucratic restructuring then 
underway to improve Mexico’s environment by facilitating improved communications 
between the government and the community. In short, President de la Madrid seemed to 
suggest that the Mexican people’s callous ways were ruining Mexico’s environment, but 
together, the nation could improve air quality under the guiding hand of the government. 
Teresa Weiser covered this speech, and had many possible environmental topics from the 
assembly on which she could have focused – like the introduction of a new air quality 
monitoring network in the Valley of Mexico, or the transition of fuel oil to natural gas at 
the March 18 Refinery. But Weiser, a longstanding environmental reporter, titled her 
story, “The State is not solely responsible for the environment, affirmed de la Madrid,”55 
subtly criticizing the President’s rhetoric, and showcasing the government’s attempt to 
shift the blame for the nation’s pollution to the Mexican people. 
Some environmental reporters, however, transmitted the idea that Mexicans really 
were to blame for their degraded air quality, and their motives for doing so varied from 
raising environmental awareness among readers to promoting the government’s blame-
shifting to the public. In an editorial for Uno Más Uno, Fernando Césarman referred to 
the national air pollution problem as a “chronic crisis,” and noted that despite years of 
warnings about the dangers of air pollution, “we [Mexican society], the source of the 
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danger, are not willing to listen and do something to improve the situation.”56 He went on 
to suggest that “It is not possible that we are so paralyzed that absolutely nothing can be 
done to improve the environmental conditions. It is really surprising.”57 In this sample, 
Césarman never blamed individuals in his environmental reporting. Instead, in addressing 
environmental concerns he preferred to blame Mexican society in general. This is 
strikingly different from the environmental reporting covered so far in that Césarman’s 
readers were made to feel like part of the problem (and part of the solution), whereas 
reporters like Teresa Weiser or Mario Ruiz R. placed the blame squarely on government 
or industrial entities and framed their readers as victims, or at the very least, passive 
observers. Because Césarman was an award winning essayist, author, and poet, with a 
long record of promoting environmental issues, it is unlikely that he was merely parroting 
the government line to ensure his continued employment as a journalist. Instead, 
Césarman may have adopted this approach in an attempt to stir Mexican readers to 
action; once people recognized that they were at fault they might take steps to reduce 
their contribution to air pollution such as using public transit or tuning up their vehicles. 
Newspaper readers, therefore, found different air pollution narratives in their papers – 
there were stories blaming malevolent polluters, and there were stories blaming society in 
general. 
Similarly, Ramón Ojeda Mestre, president of the Mexican Academy of 
Environmental Rights, also blamed contemporary Mexican society for its callous ways, 
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but targeted the nation’s sixteenth-century Spanish conquerors as well. In a story 
covering the toxic dust storms generated by Xochiaca, an unnamed reporter explained 
Mestre’s views: “Ojeda Mestre expanded on the history of the problem pointing out that 
it stems from a lack of an “environmental conscience” among the inhabitants of the 
Valley of Mexico dating from the arrival of the Spanish. Our country lives in almost total 
environmental irrationality, we are stunned trying to resolve the problems derived from 
the economic crisis, both at a national and household level, and we ignore the 
environmental disaster that accelerates more each day.”58 Whereas Césarman expressed 
surprise at the nation’s inability to address these pressing environmental problems, Ojeda 
Mestre argued that Mexico’s economic crisis had forced neglect of environmental 
problems. Although Ojeda Mestre explained the nation’s unwillingness to improve air 
quality as a symptom of a slumping economy, his underlying message blamed the 
Mexican people as a whole, just like Césarman. Ojeda Mestre’s position as president of 
the Mexican Academy for Environmental Rights suggests that he was not serving as a 
mouthpiece for the state, but rather wanted to inspire Mexicans to do what they could to 
improve air quality. 
A Mexican Green Movement spokesperson also noted the lack of an 
environmental conscience among the Mexican people in a newspaper article, although the 
organization tempered this message by also singling out organizations that contributed a 
higher percentage of air pollution, like the government-run bus company Ruta 100, local 
cement factories, and the oft-blamed March 18 Refinery. The spokesperson told the 
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reporter, “if the situation is in itself serious, it is further complicated by the incredible 
indifference maintained despite the danger of a total disaster that can not be avoided 
unless consciousness is raised concerning the magnitude of the pollution problem and the 
people and the government work immediately towards a solution.”59 Although the story 
primarily focused on a seven-point plan crafted by the Mexican Green Movement to 
reduce pollution in the Valley of Mexico, someone at the paper decided to entitle the 
article, “Danger of environmental disaster in the city due to the lack of social 
conscience.”60 This title reinforced the message that the people of Mexico were to blame 
for the dire environmental straits they were in, even though the heart of the story dealt 
with efforts to improve the environment. 
Some journalists chose to blame air pollution on individual drivers, rather than 
government policies that encouraged the forty-year mass migration to the Valley of 
Mexico while creating a transportation system designed for the personal automobile. One 
reporter included Mexican vehicle owners along with greedy industries and inept 
government leaders in a list of chronic polluters: “every year, automobile owners prove to 
be more irresponsible by not maintaining their vehicles in a good state.”61  Similarly, at a 
rally protesting pollution, Mexican Green Movement president Alfonso Ciprés Villarreal 
named the Valley of Mexico’s millions of vehicles as “one of the chief factors” of air 
pollution, thereby joining a notorious list that included heavy industries in the valley and 
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the e. coli-laden dust storms originating from Xochiaca.62 About eighty-five percent of 
Mexico City’s air pollutants came from vehicles, so drawing attention to the biggest 
polluter in the valley was warranted.63 But blaming the drivers was shortsighted and 
unfair, as many Mexicans were too poor to keep their vehicles in good shape, and 
furthermore, the government, which owned Pemex, had done nothing to promote energy 
conservation. 
Linking Air Pollution with Other Problems 
Aside from assigning blame, environmental reporters also connected air pollution 
with other problems, especially heath and deforestation. The frequent occurrence of these 
human and ecological health issues in environmental reporting reflects a desire among 
reporters to find order among the complex relationships surrounding air pollution. By 
explaining how air pollution directly caused human illnesses, reporters educated readers 
as to why they were sick. Knowing the cause of their illness, Mexicans could then take 
steps to alleviate it, such as advocating for better air quality, or protesting government 
inaction. 
Environmental reporters endeavored to uncover health problems across the 
country related to poor air quality in order to convince the public of the dangers of 
inhaling polluted air. In an article reporting on air pollution created by a zinc processing 
plant in Saltillo, Coahuila, Joaquin Paredes wrote for Excélsior that “the emissions and 
discharges of chemical substances from this plant cause serious damage to the respiratory 
                                                 
62 "Subió a 97.5% el indice de contaminación en la ciudad de México, dice el movimiento 
ecologista," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), May 26, 1984. 
63 J.R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-
Century World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 77. 
38 
 
 
 
tracts and to the eyesight of the inhabitants of this city.”64 Mario Ruiz R. wrote for 
Excélsior in a similar style for a story about air pollution in Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz: 
“The effects of the air pollution on the health of the inhabitants of Minatitlán and 
Coatzacoalcos reflect the high index of problems of the respiratory tracts and of 
gastrointestinal illnesses. In both cities the people live within an asphyxiating 
atmosphere.”65 In Ensenada, Baja California, Javier Cruz A. quantified the effects of air 
pollution on the citizens of this northern coastal city: “Between ten and fifteen percent of 
the population suffers from illnesses of the respiratory tract, caused by air pollution.”66 In 
all three examples the authors made direct connections between air pollution and illnesses 
in a very matter-of-fact way, and agreed that there was no question that air pollution 
made people sick. 
Mexican journalists often relied on the testimony of environmentalists to 
communicate the dangers of air pollution. A news brief in Uno Más Uno quoted statistics 
from the Mexican Green Movement, noting that in Mexico City alone more than a 
million people suffered from respiratory illnesses, 250,000 from pinkeye, 260,000 were 
afflicted with asthma, and a million people dealt with allergies.67 This particular story 
appeared in the City and Government news brief section and consisted of only one 
                                                 
64 Joaquin Paredes, "Requiere 14 mil millones Zincamex para dejar de contaminar el ambiente: 
SDUE," Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Aug. 19, 1983. 
65 Mario Ruiz R., "Pasividad de las autoridades federales," Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Sep. 
12, 1983. 
66 Javier Cruz A., "Grave contaminación causan varias industrias en Ensenada," Excélsior (Mexico 
City, Mexico), Sep. 26, 1983 
67 "Alarmantes, los efectos de la infición," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), July 7, 1984. 
39 
 
 
 
paragraph, which suggests that journalists tried to communicate the dangers of air 
pollution in different formats for different types of readers. 
An unnamed author for Uno Más Uno communicated a similar message in a story 
that at first glance appears to have nothing to do with air pollution. In a story about the 
lack of green space in Mexico City, this journalist interviewed administrators from both 
the Department of Preventative Medicine and the Office of Education for the Health of 
UNAM who explained that “air pollution, due to urban and industrial activity, causes 
illnesses like bronchitis, symptoms of asthma, and other respiratory distress.”68 The 
reporter went on to examine the connection between trees and air quality, a common 
narrative that is discussed later in this chapter. 
As previously noted, Teresa Weiser interviewed Jorge Paulat from the 
Nezahualcóyotl System of Health about the creation of Xociaca, a large lake of raw 
sewage. She also relied on his medical expertise to communicate the health risks of the 
dust clouds that blew off the desiccated lagoon in the dry season, spreading fecal bacteria 
across the valley. He explained to her that, “the majority of Mexico City citizens have 
developed resistance to this type of microorganism, but very often cultures of E. Coli are 
found in the larynxes and pharynxes of patients.”69 While some people developed 
respiratory illnesses like pneumonia as a result of E. Coli in the respiratory tract, most 
Valley of Mexico residents had at least some resistance to the bacteria. Still, it must have 
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been a shock for readers to learn that they were breathing in bacteria spawned from 
human waste. 
While many of the stories examined so far detailed illnesses that could be treated, 
other environmental journalists explored the relationship between air pollution and more 
dangerous diseases. Juan G. Reyes interviewed Yolanda Falcón Briseño from the 
Department of Energy at UAM – Azcapotzalco about a study by New York University 
that found Azcapotzalco’s air to be the second most polluted in the world. Briseño 
warned that the impacts of poor air quality went beyond reduced visibility and higher 
cases of asthma; the study revealed “the presence of heavy metals in the atmosphere, 
especially the presence of highly cancerous organic particles that cause genetic 
mutations.”70 In a front-page story detailing the many environmental crises facing the 
Valley of Mexico, Dr. Enrique Riva Palacio Chiang, a professor of Pollution and 
Environmental Degradation at UNAM, warned that breathing in the city’s air could, 
“decrease one’s appetite, which causes damage to the digestive tract; cause breathing 
difficulties, nausea, and vomiting; cause rapid heartbeat; and long-term impacts include, 
kidney, liver and cardiovascular system diseases. In the nervous system mental disorders, 
mild manias, hysterics, moodiness, and depression, as well as severe headaches have 
been detected.”71 Surely these maladies aroused more concern among readers than 
increased cases of bronchitis or pinkeye. The message was pretty clear: breathing Mexico 
City’s air could kill you. 
                                                 
70 Juan G. Reyes, "Ocupa México el segundo lugar entre los países más contaminados," Excélsior 
(Mexico City, Mexico), Oct. 13, 1983. 
71 "Crece la contaminación en el DF," Excélsior (Mexico City, Mexico), Aug. 27, 1983. 
41 
 
 
 
If Mexico’s air was dangerous for adults, then it was especially dangerous for 
children, whose bodies were still developing. Environmental reporters made efforts to 
spread this message among the populace. In Victor Manuel Juárez’s frighteningly titled 
news story “Pollution, one of the Top Ten Causes of Death in the DF [Federal District],” 
the author noted, “Mexico City residents are condemned to suffer from respiratory 
diseases because air pollution is such – detritus, smoke, dust, and various toxic gases – 
that already, [it has reached levels that] turn out to be fatal.”  He went on to note that this 
pollution “causes gastrointestinal and ocular illnesses, mainly in children.”72 Another 
story published a month later also drew connections between poor air quality and the 
health of Mexico’s children. The unnamed reporter interviewed the President of the 
Mexican Green Movement, Alfonso Ciprés Villarreal, who noted that “in Mexico City, 
childhood illnesses have increased by 600 percent in recent years, as a consequence of 
environmental pollution, and serious epidemics have occurred that have not happened 
anywhere else in the world.”73 The journalist highlighted the significance of this alarming 
increase in childhood illnesses by using the statistic as the story’s byline. Environmental 
journalists wanted their readers to see the connection between air pollution and unhealthy 
human bodies, and by focusing on the impacts of children’s bodies they likely hoped that 
Mexicans would see how detrimental the pollution was to those least guilty of creating it  
Another prominent connection Mexican journalists strived to make was the 
relationship between air quality and deforestation. Trees remove air pollutants such as 
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ozone, carbon monoxide, and sulfur dioxide by absorbing them, thereby creating a 
cleaner atmosphere. In fact, a single tree can remove up to ten pounds of pollutants from 
the air each year.74 Many reporters wrote stories lamenting the loss of Mexico’s trees, 
especially in the Valley of Mexico, and raised concerns over the resulting degradation in 
air quality. In a story for Uno Más Uno that discussed air pollution in Naucalpan, 
Atizapán, and Tlalnepantla (Mexico City suburbs), local professor Francisco Manuel 
Carreño Pantoja explained, “it is urgent to start reforesting these towns in order to 
strengthen the green lungs [emphasis in original] that remain in these areas.”75 By 
comparing the respiration of trees with the respiration of people, Carreño Pantoja 
connected the health of the region’s ecosystem with the health of individual Mexicans.  
A similar connection between air pollution and trees exists in an article published 
to highlight the lack of green spaces in Mexico City. In it, Silvia Turpín, a professor at 
UAM, noted that “Mexico [City] only has two lungs of oxygenation; El Ajusco and el 
Desierto de los Leones [both nearby national parks], which are insufficient for the 
seventeen million inhabitants of the Federal District.”  Similar to the previous story, an 
academic referred to trees as the city’s lungs in a metaphor intended to connect 
deforestation with poor air quality. Indeed, one of the major objectives cited by the 
Mexican Green Movement in an anti-pollution rally was their intention to plant 40,200 
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trees in the center of Mexico City, mostly near schools so that children could breathe 
cleaner air.76 
The Government is the Solution 
So far the sources examined in this chapter have largely been drawn from 
academics, doctors, or non-governmental environmental organizations like the Mexican 
Green Movement, but government officials and government-friendly reporters also 
contributed air pollution narratives to Uno Más Uno, and especially, Excélsior. 
Unsurprisingly, their comments often asserted that the government had the air pollution 
problem under control, and frequently adopted a defensive tone when questioned about 
the nation’s poor environmental record. Throughout his presidency, President De la 
Madrid worked to cultivate an image of environmental sensitivity and awareness, best 
exemplified by the 1984 National Environmental Congress. As mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, political scientist Stephen Mumme labeled this effort “preemptive 
reform,” suggesting that the president’s embrace of environmentalism was merely a ploy 
to redirect non-governmental environmental action into government channels.77 
Whatever De la Madrid’s motives, it is clear that Mexico’s government made a few 
modest efforts to improve air quality in the 1980s, and government spokespeople used the 
newspapers included in this sample to promote them. 
Teresa Weiser noted the ignorance surrounding a quantitative understanding of 
pollution levels for the Valley of Mexico by writing a story about the lack of an air 
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quality monitoring network, and interviewed a government administrator who claimed 
that the federal government was already taking steps to install such a network. While it 
was possible at the time to measure particulate concentrations at the sources of industrial 
emissions, there was no measuring equipment set up around the valley to measure air 
pollution dispersed by the weather. The establishment of an air quality monitoring 
network meant, for instance, that if sulfur dioxide levels climbed above seventy 
micrograms per cubic meter (the guideline set by the World Health Organization) in 
Azcapotzalco, Naucalpan, or Nezahualcóyotl, the measuring equipment could detect it 
and then city administrators could issue a warning to area residents to limit their outdoor 
exposure.78 The Pemex Manager of Environmental Protection, Francisco Ramírez 
Chávez, agreed that a network of air quality measuring stations was needed, and assured 
Weiser, “We believe that the authorities are going to determine the air quality that should 
exist in the Valley of Mexico in real form and without having to take on foreign 
owners.”79 In other words, the Mexican government could be trusted not only to operate 
the network, but also to establish appropriate air quality standards. Furthermore, he 
asserted that Mexico was capable of building the network without the financial assistance 
offered by foreign capital.80 
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One month after this story’s publication, the announcement of the network’s 
creation was one of the key talking points at the National Environmental Congress, which 
indicates that President De la Madrid wanted to reassure the population that 
environmental issues were best managed through proper government channels.81 Other 
major announcements at the conference included a switch to cleaner natural gas at the 
March 18 Refinery, and that Pemex had made a six billion-peso investment to treat waste 
water and gas emissions in order to improve environmental quality. Teresa Weiser, 
usually a sharp critic of poor government environmental action, merely listed off the 
improvements the government announced at the Assembly, and refrained from any overt 
criticism. The majority of her story reads like a summary of the federal government’s 
proactive battle against air pollution. It is possible that she was fearful of criticizing such 
a highly publicized event. As noted above, the only hint of criticism appeared with the 
title of her story, “DLM [De la Madrid] declares: The environment is not only the State’s 
responsibility,” which could be construed to suggest that President de la Madrid was 
shifting the blame for Mexico’s environmental problems and the onus to improve them 
onto the people of Mexico. 
In an article about the terrible pollution plaguing Coatzacoalcos, reporter Mario 
Ruiz R. contrasted the environmental efforts of Pemex with other industries in the city. 
He wrote, “Pemex has been the most responsible company concerning the government 
laws to carry out pollution prevention and control in its facilities. The spokesperson for 
the management of Pemex in the Southern Zone, Rafael Marquet, announced that this 
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year they allocated 486 million pesos for environmental protection, environmental 
studies, and land restoration.”82 Ruiz then listed eleven companies in and around 
Coatzacoalcos, naming and shaming them in an unfavorable light compared to the 
government-run Pemex. While on the surface it appears that Ruiz was merely parroting 
the government line, the story does include criticism of the government’s inability to 
enforce environmental regulations among private industries. Yet Pemex (hardly a shining 
beacon of clean energy) came out of the story looking good, and Mario Ruiz’s reporting 
helped Rafael Marquet spread the word about the government’s efforts to improve the 
environment. 
Even as other reporters increasingly began to excoriate Mexico’s oil industry for 
its air pollution, Pemex worked to cultivate an environmentally friendly image, appearing 
frequently in newspaper articles announcing new measures designed to curb air pollution. 
In May 1984, Pemex Manager of Environmental Protection, Francisco Ramírez Chávez, 
announced the reduction of sulfur and lead in gasoline sold in the Valley of Mexico. He 
explained that this measure would reduce the emission of atmospheric contaminants, 
thereby resulting in cleaner air for Mexico City and its environs. The article closes with 
an emphatic proclamation from Ramírez Chávez of Pemex’s commitment to being green: 
“Pemex is ready to apply all appropriate actions to improve the environment.”83 When 
the Director of Pemex, Mario Ramón Beteta, addressed the first National Environmental 
Congress that following June, he noted this reduction of sulfur and lead among a list of 
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other steps that Mexico’s oil industry had taken to improve the environment. He argued 
that Pemex was not the primary source of pollution in Mexico, (although the cars that ran 
on Pemex’s petroleum were). Moreover, he reminded the audience that Pemex had 
allocated more than six billion pesos for environmental protection programs, and that the 
company had transitioned from oil to natural gas at the March 18 Refinery.84 Teresa 
Weiser reported all of these announcements in a story for Uno Más Uno, but also 
included criticism espoused by Fernando Hiriart, the Director of the Federal Electric 
Commission, who, at the same conference, called Pemex one of the biggest polluters in 
Mexico and called for cleaner energy sources.85 
Weiser’s article contained two different opinions on government environmental 
accountability, and points to the larger debate occurring in the pages of Excélsior and 
Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984. While the majority of environmental stories sampled in 
this chapter came from journalists who best fit Hughes’s civic journalism model and were 
not afraid to criticize government and industrial administrators and policies, these same 
reporters often sourced government spokespeople who painted a more environmentally 
friendly portrait of the government. The inclusion of both points of view, often within the 
same story, suggests that most Mexican reporters covering air pollution made an effort to 
write unbiased stories. Different points of view allowed readers to judge for themselves 
which spokesperson best represented reality. Some journalists left this decision 
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completely in the hands of the reader, while others, as demonstrated above with Teresa 
Weiser, had a proclivity to subtly nudge readers toward the source that best fit what they 
believed the truth to be. 
By 1992 Mexico City had the worst air pollution in the world, and in response to 
international and domestic criticism, Mexico’s federal government finally took measures 
to improve air quality for their nation’s capital. It passed a law requiring catalytic 
converters on all cars being sold in Mexico, and provided incentives for industry to move 
out of the Valley of Mexico. Pemex introduced low-lead gasoline, and transitioned many 
of its refineries to natural gas. As a result, there is less sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, 
and lead in the air now than in 1984, but the ever increasing number of vehicles in the 
city still frequently give rise to days with unhealthy levels of ozone.86 Mexico City still 
has work to do in terms of providing a breathable space for its citizens, but conditions are 
drastically better than they were when these newspaper articles were published. 
Environmental journalists placed Mexico’s air pollution in the spotlight in 1983 
and 1984, and although it took several years, the government did finally take action to 
improve the city’s air quality. In the PRI’s quest to modernize Mexico in the mid-
twentieth century, it had encouraged the growth of industry and population in the Valley 
of Mexico. But the unintended side effect of this – terrible air pollution – opened the 
regime up to both international and domestic criticism, which eventually forced party 
leaders to enact mitigation policies in an attempt to maintain its modern image. 
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By consistently reporting on air pollution, these environmental reporters kept the 
pressure on government administrators. They showed their readers who and what was 
causing air pollution, but equally important was understanding the connections between 
poor air quality and ecological and human health. These relationships could be quite 
complex, but Mexican journalists consulted experts in the field who could explain the 
links between ecology, pollution, and health, and in doing so empowered Mexican 
readers with the knowledge needed to advocate for change through civic action. At the 
same time, President De la Madrid’s government worked to cultivate an image of 
environmental sensitivity and awareness, and it sometimes used newspapers and 
journalists to spread this message. While the means by which to improve air quality 
differed depending on which story one read, the underlying message in Mexico’s papers 
reporting on air pollution in 1983 and 1984 was that something had to change. The 
abundance of stories about air pollution during this period demonstrate how critical the 
problem had become, and reveal the conflictual nature of Mexico’s air pollution 
discourse as told by journalists. But air pollution was not the only environmental problem 
confronting Mexico, and newspapers reflected diverse environmental narratives on other 
topics as well. As the next chapter on forests will show, not all problems were as 
successfully managed as air pollution. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 “Long Live the Tree!.Long Live Mankind!”: Journalists, Forests, and Mexico’s 
Quest for Rational Development 
 
During the summer of 1984, the government of the Federal District, the army, and 
several surrounding city municipal governments launched a campaign of reforestation to 
plant more than thirteen million trees across the Valley of Mexico. Award-winning 
author and air quality advocate Fernando Césarman used his editorial column in Uno Más 
Uno to praise the effort, and encouraged the seventeen to twenty million Mexicans living 
in the valley to add to this total by each planting one tree. He wrote that, “[This citizen 
planting] would be a task in the direction of life…To the motto of Long live the tree! we 
should add Long live mankind!, that ultimately is what really matters.”87 But Césarman’s 
editorial concluded with an alarming note: The Central Light and Power utility was 
planning to clear cut a strip of forest in the hills surrounding the Valley of Mexico thirty 
meters wide for forty kilometers in order to construct high tension power lines. To this he 
sarcastically exclaimed, “Who cares [about the loss of all those trees]!  We will not have 
air but we will have plenty of electricity.”88 For Césarman, trees could best serve 
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Mexicans as air filters, and cutting them down – even in the service of electrification – 
was a foolish mistake.89 
Political scientist Raúl Olmedo Carranza provided a very different opinion on the 
future of Mexico’s forests in his thirty-five editorial series special entitled “Our Lost 
Forests” for his daily column “The Crisis” in Excélsior. This author, who also worked as 
a professor of political science and public administration at the National Autonomous 
University of Mexico (UNAM), repeatedly called for a more efficient and active national 
logging industry. In the first editorial of this series he lamented, “Each year, thirty million 
cubic meters of wood is transformed into dust, disintegrated, to return in a cycle of 
reincarnation in which it is converted into another thirty million cubic meters of wood 
unexploited by man, that will once again be converted into dust.”90 In referring to 
decomposing wood as dust, Olmedo described a nutrient replenishment cycle that had 
sustained the forests for millions of years as merely a wasteful process that helps no one. 
Pointing out that Mexico has more forest acreage than Norway, Sweden, or Finland, 
Olmedo argued that harvesting Mexico’s forests would bring in much needed money for 
more than ten million Mexicans. In contrast to Césarman, Olmedo thought his nation’s 
trees would best serve the people as rationally-harvested wood and paper products that 
could fuel a slumping economy. But his call for lumber products came with the warning 
that the logging must be conducted carefully, “The harmful exploitation of forests and 
jungles is evident in the fact that each year we lose 400,000 hectares. Erosion already 
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affects sixteen percent of the national territory.”91 Olmedo believed that forests could 
bring great wealth to Mexico, but only under the careful guidance of a rational federal 
forestry policy. 
As Césarman’s and Olmedo’s editorials demonstrate, newspaper articles from 
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984 expressed concern over the nation’s 
forests, and environmental narratives presented different opinions over which factors 
constituted the biggest threats, and over what role Mexico’s trees should play in its 
economy, ecology, and society. This is not surprising given the economic restructuring, 
environmental crises, and increasing criticism of the government occurring throughout 
the decade.92 Due to the soaring national debt, the federal government reexamined its role 
in operating the nation’s logging industry, and transitioned to privatization in an effort to 
cut costs. Campesinos (rural peasants) also felt the pinch from the slumping economy and 
pushed for more control over lumber resources on their communally held land.93 
Environmentalists recognized the widespread erosion, desertification, and ecological 
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problems resulting from unchecked logging and called for more forest protection. At the 
same time, logging corporations endeavored to turn a profit from Mexico’s trees. Thus, 
many conflicting forest narratives appeared in the newspapers included in this sample, 
rendering a lively national dialogue concerning the future of the nation’s trees and 
forestry policy. 
Mexico’s forests existed within a diversity of climates and ecosystems – from the 
cool, dry, temperate conifer stands of northern and central Mexico to the hot, lowland 
tropical rain forests in the southeast – and these different forests held a variety of 
resources and logging-recovery capabilities. The drier northern forests included species 
that had evolved within a periodic fire regime, and therefore were accustomed to re-
growing every few decades. This made the ecosystem relatively adaptable to periodic 
logging, provided the loggers replanted new trees after a felling. However, wildfires were 
very rare in the tropical rain forest, so most tree species inhabiting them were not evolved 
to grow well in large open spaces. Instead, the seedlings depended on the thick forest 
canopy to protect them and their soil from the region’s frequent torrential rains. If a 
tropical rain forest is clear cut, the soil is quickly washed away, leaving behind hardpan, 
which only weeds can colonize. Erosion was a serious problem in Mexico’s tropical 
regions, but due to the country’s mountainous terrain, even the temperate regions suffered 
from the affliction wherever loggers failed to harvest responsibly.94 
While severe erosion had afflicted some regions of Mexico since the sixteenth 
century when Spanish colonialists leveled forests to fuel silver mines, forest destruction 
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accelerated erosion under the political stability of Porfirio Díaz (1884-1911) and 
increased further with the rise of industrialization throughout the twentieth century. By 
1984, thirty percent of Mexico’s forests were seriously damaged from erosion with the 
southeast in particularly bad shape – for instance, ninety percent of the state of Oaxaca 
was eroded.95 Mexican newspaper articles from Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 
1984 addressed these issues, and presented an environmental discourse on how to best 
obtain the wealth growing in the forests without further degrading the country’s 
environment. 
Reporters and their sources filled these two newspapers with a variety of forest 
narratives, but upon close analysis, three general arguments emerge: valuable forest 
resources were going to waste due to unsustainable harvesting; logging caused ecological 
problems with detrimental impacts for humanity; and the federal government was 
working to develop an environmentally-friendly, sustainable forest policy that would 
benefit more Mexicans. In many stories these arguments overlapped. Articles that 
focused on ecological damage due to frequent logging blamed unsustainable harvesting 
for causing the problem, while articles that focused on the loss of forest products due to 
unsustainable harvesting often noted the ecological damage that accompanied it. 
Unsurprisingly, articles extolling government efforts to protect forests frequently cited 
unsustainable harvesting and ecological damage as the reason the government needed to 
take action in the first place. So while three separate arguments appear, they are in many 
ways complimentary, with one providing evidence to support another. 
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Although similarities exist between environmental reports on air pollution and 
forestry, the rural quality of Mexico’s forests generated some key differences in the way 
reporters told their stories. Similar to the trend noted with air pollution in chapter one, 
government spokespeople and government-friendly journalists assured readers that the 
federal government knew about the environmental problem, and was taking steps to 
alleviate it. Likewise, as with air pollution, environmental journalists and their sources 
targeted corporations and the federal government for causing the problems associated 
with logging. However, there existed a vibrant discussion over what role campesinos 
played in environmental destruction, and what role they should play in the future of the 
forest industry. Therefore, forest narratives contained discussion over a particular rural 
social group that was lacking in air pollution narratives discussing urban spaces  
Mexicans viewed forests as critically important to the environmental health of the 
nation, as well as vitally important to Mexico’s economic strength at a time when the 
economy was struggling. Stories about the damage caused by logging focused on the 
health of ecosystems, rather than the health of humans as did the stories about air 
pollution. This fact makes it all the more surprising that among the sample of 216 
environmental news stories in Excélsior and Uno Más Uno from 1983 and 1984, 
reporters wrote more stories about rural forests than they did about urban air pollution in 
the Valley of Mexico (which impacted eighteen million people).96 Environmental 
reporters and their sources struggled to sort out the complex processes giving rise to the 
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destruction of Mexico’s valuable forest resources even as they simultaneously tried to 
catalogue the extent of the environmental damage and promulgate a sustainable forest use 
policy. Their efforts educated readers, many of whom were urban and far removed from 
the crisis, about the importance of using forest resources in a way that did not lead to 
environmental crisis. The lack of consensus on a specific policy among the many 
environmental narratives demonstrates the complexity of striking a balance between 
environmental and economic concerns during a period of both environmental and 
economic crisis. 
The rest of this chapter contains three sections that support this argument. Section 
one, “Irrational Forest Use,” examines stories from the many different types of sources 
that attempted to describe forest-use in Mexico as irrational; this complex word 
“irracional” best translates to “unsustainable” in this context, but exactly what irracional 
meant changed from one story to the next. While government administrators frequently 
used this word in referencing campesino subsistence logging, university biology 
researchers used the same word to describe massive clear cutting by logging 
corporations, and some reporters simply used it to describe poorly-regulated Mexican 
forestry policy as a whole. Although the meaning of irracional varied, most of those 
sources or reporters who used it for news stories attempted to describe the waste they saw 
in it, and blamed those they thought responsible for its persistence. Section two, 
“Logging and the Environment,” analyzes articles that focused on qualifying and 
quantifying environmental damage caused by logging, and articles that celebrated efforts 
to reverse this damage. Most of the stories in this section emphasized cataloguing 
environmental damage in forests rather than discussing a balance between environmental 
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and economic interests. Section three, “Government as the Solution to Irrational 
Forestry,” considers the federal government’s messages concerning the development of a 
national, rational forest-use policy, and examines what sort of promises they made and to 
whom. 
Irrational Forest Use 
Throughout the 1980s, newspapers conveyed a sense of incredulity at the 
rampant, often unregulated, destruction of Mexico’s forests, frequently using the phrases 
“immoderate tree felling” (tala inmoderada) or “irrational exploitation” (explotación 
irracional) to describe the complex factors that gave rise to this destruction, and 
frequently called for “rational exploitation” (explotación racional) as a solution to 
economic, social, and environmental problems. While these three phrases appeared often 
in articles, there was no specific definition for them upon which all reporters could agree. 
Many journalists (and sources) described the logging practices of corporations as tala 
inmoderada or explotación irracional, while a smaller number blamed government 
corruption, collusion, or disorganization for giving rise to irrational forest use. 
Newspapers also discussed the role of the campesino in forest destruction, with some 
authors blaming their tree-felling subsistence practices for preventing the implementation 
of explotación racional while others exonerated the campesino in favor of blaming the 
socio-economic system that encouraged their behavior. While opinions differed as to who 
was at fault, the newspapers from this sample communicated to the reading public a 
message that Mexico desperately needed a rational forest use policy that would both 
bring the nation economic wealth and preserve the nation’s environmental wealth. 
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In June 1984, Congress attempted to define and address the irrational use of 
Mexico’s forests with a proposed reform to the Federal Forestry Law. Environmental 
reporter Teresa Weiser covered the hearing for Uno Más Uno. She reported that 
lawmakers viewed the forests as a source of great national wealth that was being wasted 
due to poor policies, bad transportation networks, industrial overexploitation, and 
campesino subsistence needs that required the felling of trees every few years to create 
new agricultural plots. The Director of the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH), Horacio 
García Aguilar, announced, “we want to introduce the concept of multiple use of the 
forest and its rational exploitation,” which he later explained as establishing effective 
systems of forest harvesting that would bring campesinos into the forest economy and 
share the wealth with them.97 Interestingly, based on what Weiser wrote for the article, 
the legislators devoted most of their speeches to explaining how bad everything was, but 
left the specificities of their reform vague.98 
Failing to specify forestry reforms was a common theme among proponents of 
adopting a more rational forest use policy; rather than describing a plan to remedy the 
situation, most sources merely described the problems. For example, the President of the 
Environmental Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, Oscar Cantón Zetina, referred 
to the Lancandon Jungle in the state of Chiapas to illustrate what irrational forest use 
looked like, but failed to offer a solution: “The tropical forests have been sacked as if 
                                                 
97 Teresa Weiser, "Proyecto de ley forestal, al Congreso," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), 
Jun. 3, 1984. 
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they were mines. One obvious example is the Lancandon Jungle, which fifteen years ago 
was more than thirteen thousand square kilometers, now more than half has been 
destroyed, and if this trend continues, in less than ten years all of the area will be 
deforested.”99 By using the phrase, “sacked as if they were mines,” in describing the 
destruction of the Lancandon, Zetina simultaneously conjured up images of both a 
plundering army and the non-renewable mineral resources collected in the mining 
industry. Such harvesting practices were irrational in the mind of Zetina, but aside from a 
few vague references to campesinos harboring the solution, he failed to elucidate what a 
rational forest use policy would look like. 
National concern over the felling of tropical forests in Mexico’s southeast 
corresponded with a growing international fear of biodiversity loss in the tropics 
popularized in the 1980s, and most authors who wrote about this destruction placed the 
blame on corporations.100 An unnamed reporter covering a SARH review about the state 
of Quintana Roo, on the Yucatan Peninsula, noted, “more than one-hundred thousand 
hectares of jungle have been razed in Quintana Roo due to the irrational exploitation of 
companies like Industrialized Wood of Quintana Roo, which, by means of a twenty-nine 
year concession extracted 580,000 cubic meters of precious wood, principally cedar and 
mahogany.”101 The reporter expressed outrage at this loss, and was especially upset that 
Industrialized Wood kept most of the profits while the campesinos who lived in the 
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newly-ruined environment received a meager two-thousand peso annual income from 
selling their rights to the forestland. The reporter felt that the campesinos’ ignorance and 
poverty allowed Industrialized Wood to take advantage of them. 
Carlos Duayhe, another reporter for Uno Más Uno, also blamed the callous ways 
of industrial logging for simultaneously ruining the environment and impoverishing the 
peasants with its “explotación incontrolada.” In a front page news story about the 
deforestation and subsequent erosion problems in the southern state of Oaxaca, Duayhe 
revealed that ninety percent of the state was eroded and ninety-three percent of the state’s 
original forest had been logged in what he called “hit and run exploitation.”102 Duayhe 
interviewed Rodolfo Ramírez, a researcher from the School of Biological Sciences at the 
National Polytechnic Institute, who explained that “much of this damage comes from too 
much desire for wealth, the greed of a few who felled trees and eroded soils; with the 
exception of those who did it out of necessity.” Ramírez also lamented the loss of an 
entire way of life due to industrial logging: “We have verified that the forest has been 
destroyed, generally at the hands of companies. In this way, the land remains either 
abandoned or at the disposal of its original owners and they make poor use of the soil.”103 
Ramírez went on to lament the destruction of culture caused by this unsustainable 
logging: “The people without technical capacity, the marginalized, abandoned indigenous 
groups have totally forgotten that which their ancestors knew, this is the most sobering, 
because in the trips that we have made to Oaxaca we have seen soils totally destroyed 
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where pre-Hispanic remains of works are still seen of structures directed to impede 
erosion, terraces, constructed about the slopes of the mountains; a culture almost 
disappeared.”104 For Ramírez, the definition of irrational forest use was the actions of a 
few industrial logging corporations who not only damaged the environment beyond 
repair, but also endangered a rich historical tradition predating the arrival of the Spanish. 
Reporters tried different approaches to bring irrational forest use into the national 
spotlight. Whereas the examples noted so far were all longer news stories, Gustavo 
Rodríguez filed a news brief for Uno Más Uno which noted the links between poor 
forestry practices and erosion in the northern state of San Luis Potosí.105 This paragraph-
long story was a useful way to quickly inform readers about the importance of good 
forestry, without their having to invest the time it would take to read a full-feature story. 
A common theme among the examples analyzed so far is their focus on specific 
locations, but some reporters described irrational logging on a national scale, therefore 
putting the entire country into the same dire straits. José Ignacio Navarro González, the 
General Director of Soil and Water Conservation for SARH and a member of the 
National Commission of Arid Zones, communicated this national crisis to an unnamed 
reporter for Uno Más Uno, noting that “thirty percent of the nation’s forests and jungles, 
that is some fifteen million hectares, has been greatly damaged by erosion caused by 
immoderate felling (tala inmoderada) and negligence with respect to reforestation shown 
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by logging companies.”106 While a story highlighting problems stemming from irrational 
logging in Oaxaca may not have been of interest to a resident of Mexico City who had 
never visited southeast Mexico, the same resident might have been stirred to action by a 
story that described irrational forest use in Mexico as a whole. Different approaches 
likely yielded different results for different readers; good reporters knew this and 
diversified their reporting styles accordingly. 
Reporters also described the actions of Mexicans opposed to irrational forest use. 
This was the case in October 1983, when 1,700 people rose in protest in the state of 
Jalisco to demand an end to current forestry practices. As reporter Eduardo Chimely 
reported for Excélsior, “members of the Revolutionary Campesino Alliance demanded 
that Governor Enrique Alvarez del Castillo prevent businesses and individuals from 
exploiting 54,000 hectares of forest in the municipality of Cuautitlán, and demanded the 
retirement of the Rural Police which has threatened them so they will abandon their 
lands.”107 Chimely interviewed Aurelio Hernández, a commissary member of the 
Ayotitán Ejido, who specifically named mayor Durán Legaspi and two logging 
companies, Compañia Industrializadora and Cultivadora de Bosques, S.A., as the 
primary perpetrators of the plundering. For these campesinos, government and corporate 
figures conspired in the irrational forest use that left them impoverished and persecuted, 
and publicly naming their persecutors was a way to fight back. Hernández argued that the 
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campesinos were ready to form communal cooperatives to exploit forest resources, and 
that this was the most rational way to convert trees to wealth. 
When reporters for Excélsior and Uno Más Uno interviewed campesinos about 
sustainability, the campesinos frequently explained irrational forest use as a by-product of 
government and industry corruption. As noted above, campesinos in Jalisco demonstrated 
against state and local government figures who they claimed were actively conspiring 
with two logging companies to acquire what belonged to the campesinos, but an article 
documenting the irrational logging of a forest in the Valley of Mexico known as 
Magdalena Contreras made similar claims against the federal government. Once again, 
representatives for these communal land holders named names in an attempt to bring 
their nefarious actions to wider public attention: “the lack of a communal commission to 
organize the exploitation of [the forest’s] resources, and the presence of ‘corrupt pseudo-
leaders’ like Rosendo Bautista and Auraliano Velazco, who traffic in communal lands, 
are the most serious sources of conflict in this zone.”108 These sources went on to link 
Bautista’s and Velazco’s corrupt activities with the paper factory Loreto y Peña Pobre to 
whom they licensed the exploitation of the wood, the Federal Commission of Electricity 
whom they permitted to clear forest in order to install power lines against the wishes of 
the locals, and the Ministry of Agrarian Reform with whom they colluded to traffic in 
communal lands. 
That these accusations came from campesinos speaks to the contempt the rural 
poor held for government accountability and egalitarianism, and the presence of such 
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articles in two of Mexico’s major newspapers suggests that by 1984, some environmental 
journalists were willing to listen to, and publish, the opinions of the poor, even 
concerning issues as far-reaching as national forest use policy. Several weeks later, Alicia 
Ortiz filed a story for Uno Más Uno with many of the same claims from campesino 
spokespeople alleging links between government corruption and irrational forest use in 
Magdalena Contreras. In addition to naming Rosendo Bautista and Loreto y Peña Pobre 
as perpetrators of corrupt logging deals, Unión de Comuneros member Gabriel Juárez 
accused the Ministry of Agrarian Reform of refusing to convene elections for legally 
recognized communal representatives, thereby permitting the illegal exploitation of the 
forest to continue. “Their lands will be set aside for the construction of houses for the 
employees of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. There are very strong interests that cause 
the civil servants to oppose the naming of representatives.”109 These examples implicated 
the government as a direct player in the irrational logging of a popular recreation spot in 
the Valley of Mexico. 
Campesinos themselves were a popular topic in newspaper articles from this 
sample discussing irrational forest use. While reporters and sources frequently accused 
campesinos’ subsistence logging practices and communal land holdings of standing in the 
way of rational forest development, reporters focused blame on the social and economic 
structures of Mexico rather than the campesinos themselves. Raul Olmedo, the author 
who wrote thirty-five editorials for the Excélsior series “Our Lost Forests,” devoted 
several of them to discussing the relationship between campesinos and forestry. In “Our 
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Lost Forests IV: A Benefit not Taken Advantage Of,” Olmedo quoted extensively from a 
speech delivered by future President Carlos Salinas de Gortari delivered on December 3, 
1981, while he was the director of the Institute of Political, Economic, and Social Studies, 
in which he argued that it was unfair to blame campesinos for the rampant destruction of 
Mexico’s forests. “We should accuse the socio-economic system of being irrational, 
because it prevents the campesino from earning a sufficient salary with permanent 
employment, and he has to resort to cutting trees and shepherding for survival.”110 For 
Salinas de Gortari, the actions of campesinos did indeed amount to irrational forestry, but 
rather than blame the individuals, he blamed the social and economic system that led 
them to their destructive actions. 
Raúl Correa, a reporter for Uno Más Uno, wrote a story about the “great 
backwardness” in Mexico’s forestry sector, and once again the campesino played a 
prominent role in the discussion. He interviewed León Jorge Castaños, the Forest 
Undersecretary for SARH, to learn what was preventing the rational use of Mexico’s 
forests. Jorge Castaños explained what he saw as one of the biggest problems, “in 
Mexico, the country with the fourth largest oil reserves in the world, there are nearly four 
million homes that use firewood to cook food; a vital factor in the deforestation of the 
country.”111 The Forest Undersecretary blamed the actions of the campesinos for 
contributing to irrational forest use, but he did not scold them for their behavior, rather, 
he argued that they were merely victims of an inefficient system. The following week 
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Correa wrote a story about deforestation, and discussed the connections between 
economics, campesino subsistence, and the felling of trees. “Of every million inhabitants 
that live in the forested areas (ten million in total) of the country, only 95,000 find 
permanent employment in the exploitation of the resource. The economic revenue for the 
rest depends, generally, on the gathering [of wood] and the felling [of trees] to 
complement their subsistence.”112 Correa’s characterization of the campesino’s 
relationship to the forest is yet another case in which the campesino is both blamed and 
exonerated for the destruction of Mexico’s forests. In his opinion, the campesino was 
indeed responsible for unsustainable logging, but poverty gave rise to this action rather 
than greed or malice. 
Raul Olmedo, and some of the sources from whom he quoted, found the nation’s 
communal land system to blame for preventing a rational forest policy from being 
implemented. Across the countryside, especially in central Mexico, villages owned much 
of the landscape in common for the campesinos who lived there. This land ownership 
pattern, known as the ejido system, provided land for agricultural use and small-scale 
resource exploitation, but it made the large-scale transfer of land – and the forest 
resources on it – more difficult to process than if the land were owned privately. For 
Olmedo, such a system was terribly wasteful since technocrats could not direct a rational 
harvest of trees. In an editorial for his “Our Lost Forests” series he wrote of the ejidos: 
“In these areas live almost ten million campesinos that remain in the worst 
marginalization, despite being possessors of the rights to a resource that under efficient 
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forms of organization could be the basis of their development. When the campesino does 
not see in the forest a source of permanent work that permits a life with dignity, he is 
converted into an enemy to control.”113 The Director of Forestry Development for SARH, 
Carlos Valdés Sandoval, agreed with Olmedo, “Land ownership in our country is 
primarily ejidal and communal. If the campesinos themselves do not take over the 
production of raw materials in an organized and productive manner, we cannot have 
rational exploitation.”114 
Campesinos had used forest resources for their subsistence for much of the 
twentieth century, so rural communities held a strong belief in their right to these 
resources in 1983 and 1984. A growing campesino population had been relying on 
dwindling forests in some areas as early as the 1930s.115 Their traditional use of these 
forests imbued many campesinos with the notion that these forest resources belonged to 
them, to be used in whatever manner they saw fit. Therefore, policy analysts supporting 
the privatization of ejido forest resources frequently presented narratives which 
emphasized the ways in which this policy would benefit campesinos. 
In a follow up editorial, Olmedo once again interviewed Sandoval, who claimed 
to be working on a plan in which campesinos on ejidos could harvest their forests and 
keep most of their wealth. He told Olmedo: “They [campesinos] should be the true 
beneficiaries of the rational development of forest resources. The forest should be a factor 
that contributes to the creation of a more egalitarian society. You need to consider that 
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the forest should be in the service of humanity and the nation, and not for the usufruct of 
a few.”116 While the Mexican Revolution had established the ejido system specifically to 
benefit the nation’s campesinos, these articles demonstrate a shift in beliefs in the early 
1980s among policymakers, who started to reframe ejidos as structures of 
impoverishment.117 Therefore, although these articles discussed primarily forest policy, 
they matched the perspective of Mexico’s contemporary technocrats and political elites, 
who believed the ejido system needed to be modernized by allowing ejido members to 
deal directly with outsiders for the exploitation of their lands.118 
In all of these stories, newspaper reporters, government administrators, university 
researchers, and campesinos endeavored to describe the irrational forest use they believed 
to be happening across Mexico. Although opinions changed as to who was most 
responsible for causing this unsustainable exploitation, all of these champions of rational 
forestry viewed newspapers as a way to garner support for their causes. It was important 
to them that their countrymen understand the processes and villains that threatened a 
rational forest policy. The varying environmental narratives concerning forests suggests 
that Mexicans who cared about forests (or the raw materials they contained) in 1983 and 
1984 viewed the period as a time of crisis, and they used newspaper stories to spread a 
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sense of urgency about the need to act to secure the future of Mexico’s trees and the 
resources they represented. 
Logging and the Environment 
While some journalists discussed a rational forest use policy in the pages of 
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno, others focused on the environmental problems caused by 
tala inmoderada and explotación irracional.119 Environmental journalists worked to 
uncover links between irresponsible logging and some of the biggest environmental 
problems Mexico faced in 1983 and 1984. The major issues on which they focused 
included the impact of deforestation on rivers and groundwater, its connection to erosion, 
its contribution to ecological degradation, and its impacts on air quality. While authors 
lamented the loss of forests, they expressed equal passion in celebrating reforestation 
campaigns, announcements for which frequently appeared in the newspaper. Among the 
sources analyzed for this section, there was a good mix between urban and rural forests. 
Mexico City had several forest reserves within and surrounding the city, and reporters 
covered threats to these urban green spaces with vigor. The scale of deforestation was 
much higher in rural areas, and through their articles, reporters notified urban readers 
about forest exploitation in regions many may have never before seen. By explaining the 
links between logging and environmental problems, environmental journalists helped 
readers to understand the complexity of consequences arising from irrational logging. 
By 1984, there were few forests remaining in the Valley of Mexico, so when 
deforestation threatened the forest of Magdalena Contreras on the southwest rim of the 
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valley, reporters explained to readers why the logging threatened more than just some 
trees. In a story for Uno Más Uno, ejido representatives from Magdalena Contreras told 
an unnamed reporter that “deforestation has caused the appearance of varieties of little 
plants that consume great quantities of water. This in turn causes the springs to generate 
less liquid for the river that provides water to the town of San Andrés and others of the 
Magdalena [River].”120 The felling of trees would have simultaneously disrupted the soil 
and provided more light for the surface, perfect conditions for both terrestrial and 
aqueous invasive plants to gain a foothold. Using the newspaper, these ejido 
representatives drew a direct connection between deforestation and a reduction of water 
flow for villages along the Magdalena River. Two weeks later, reporter Alicia Ortiz 
returned to Magdalena Contreras for Uno Más Uno and repeated this theme, explaining, 
“The Magdalena River, which in past eras was two meters deep, is almost dry, and the 
waters that do arrive are found totally contaminated with the organic wastes that are 
poured into them.”121 While both of these stories focused primarily on blaming industrial 
and government interests for irrational exploitation (as noted above), they also included 
these important warnings about how logging can damage rivers. As a way to show 
readers why deforestation should matter to them, Ortiz and these ejido representatives 
described this relationship between logging and river flows as an example of what 
happens to water supplies after unsustainable exploitation. 
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Raul Olmedo devoted much of his column space to discussing the need for a 
rational use of Mexico’s forests (as noted above), and he referenced hydrologic problems 
resulting from irrational logging as an argument for changes to be made. In an evaluation 
of the current forestry system, he noted environmental problems surrounding irrational 
logging, explaining how “a lack of legal protection for large areas of forest vegetation has 
contributed significantly to environmental pollution, the scarcity of water in periods of 
low water, and floods in wet periods.”122 Olmedo placed his analysis of environmental 
problems in between analyses of economic and social problems resulting from irrational 
forest use. For him, environmental damage was merely another unfortunate consequence 
of his nation’s inability to efficiently utilize its forest wealth. 
Environmental journalists working for Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 
1984 also connected logging with erosion, a nationwide affliction that degraded 
agricultural lands and forced campesinos to find other means of subsistence in order to 
avoid poverty. As noted above, erosion was especially bad in Oaxaca, and reporter Carlos 
Duayhe consulted an academic researching the region in order to contextualize the issue 
for his readers. Rodolfo Ramírez, a researcher from the National Polytechnic Institute, 
explained “the principal problem of Oaxaca is that the eroded soils do not retain water; 
and once denuded, if the vegetative cover has been destroyed, the erosion is more violent, 
because the rainfall is very abundant.”123 Alarmingly, Ramírez warned that the problem 
was getting worse: “while the deterioration of Oaxaca dates back to Colonial [times], the 
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truth is that the deterioration has accelerated in recent decades.”124 Duayhe and Ramírez 
also discussed the unique problems that uncontrolled logging causes in tropical rain 
forests, so that readers in the very different environment of Mexico City could understand 
why deforestation in Oaxaca was much more serious than deforestation in temperate 
regions.125 By simultaneously alerting readers about an environmental crisis in a state 
more than 400 kilometers away, and explaining why its unique attributes rendered it more 
vulnerable than other regions of Mexico, Duayhe clearly made an effort to convince 
readers to confront a distant, unseen threat to their nation’s patrimony. 
Mexico’s political leaders discussed some of these same threats in June 1984 as 
they attempted to reform federal forestry policy, and reporter Teresa Weiser wrote up 
parts of their discussion for Uno Más Uno. Oscar Cantón Zetina, the President of the 
Environmental Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, argued that both erosion and 
desertification were “grave phenomena” in Mexico, and that these crises seemed to have 
reached “apocalyptic” levels.126 In this case, Zetina described the connection between 
irrational logging and ongoing ecological crises to garner political support for a reform to 
federal forestry policy. Weiser, in turn, used his quote in the newspaper, which, coming 
from a government expert, lent an air of legitimacy to the links between logging, erosion, 
and desertification that she was trying to establish. 
Reporter Roberto Vizcaíno wrote a story about the impacts of the deforestation of 
the Lancandon Jungle in Chiapas with dire warnings similar to those noted above, but he 
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expounded on some of the other ecological damages to which the destruction of the rain 
forest gave rise. Similar to Duayhe, Vizcaíno received his information from scientists 
conducting research in the area, but in this case, two of three researchers were Americans 
and one was Mexican. This demonstrates that Vizcaíno trusted foreign sources to 
describe environmental issues in his country. In his story he wrote: “The denunciations 
and efforts to rationalize the exploitation of the jungle have failed and with this Mexico 
exchanged – say the researchers – ‘its treasure of vegetation and animal species for 
livestock, utilities, and a desert of pasture.’…Quickly, they say, this will be a desert 
because the layer of workable land is minimal and the crops will consume this final 
wealth, which only served to sustain this impressive and rich jungle that already today no 
longer exists.”127 Once again, the author drew upon scientific expertise to describe 
environmental destruction occurring in a distant location in an attempt to raise awareness 
about a problem with which urban readers most likely had no personal experience. If 
Vizcaíno could not make his readers care, he could at least inform them of what was 
happening to their country. 
Alicia Ortiz wanted readers to know how deforestation impacted a forest much 
closer to the heart of Mexico, the Magdalena Contreras growing along the mountains that 
defined the Valley of Mexico. Claiming that commoners were selling off the forest to 
paper mills because the Ministry of Agrarian Reform was in chaos, Ortiz’s source, 
Gabriel Juárez, a member of the Union of Commoners, complained that “the forest fauna 
had been practically eradicated” and also that “tourism, one of the principal sources of 
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employment in the area of Los Dínamos, had decreased notably.”128 While most of the 
stories that expressed concern over logging cited links to diminished water supplies, 
erosion, or desertification (things that impacted humanity), Ortiz and Vizcaíno represent 
a smaller, but important group of reporters lamenting the loss of biodiversity due to 
logging. These two examples demonstrate that there was a contingent of reporters 
arguing on behalf of those species who could not speak against unchecked logging for 
themselves. 
As noted in chapter one, reports about air pollution frequently noted the links 
between trees and better air quality and, unsurprisingly, stories focusing on deforestation 
also made this link. In a story for Excélsior reporting on a protest over unregulated 
logging at the Desierto de los Leones park in Mexico City, members of the Coyoacán 
Environmental Association demanded that President Miguel de la Madrid put a stop to 
the destruction of “the most important ‘lung’ of the Valley of Mexico.”129 Many forest 
advocates around Mexico City called forested areas lungs, a reference to the ability of 
trees to remove pollutants from the air, thereby generating cleaner air for the city. These 
protestors clearly saw the link between poor air quality and deforestation, and wanted 
their fellow citizens to see it too. 
Fernando Césarman also saw this link, and used his editorial column in Uno Más 
Uno to spread the news. In it, he lamented humanity’s unwillingness to protect the 
planet’s forests: “We find ourselves in a process of destruction of the forests, which are 
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the sites where oxygen is processed, where the air is recycled which is indispensible for 
breathing. According to the experts, by the year 2000 the planet’s forested area will be 
reduced by one-tenth. The ecological vision of the future is pessimistic because all the 
projections are negative. To be able to continue with life, our conduct toward nature must 
change radically.”130 While addressing Mexico’s forestry problems was a big enough 
problem for most Mexican forest advocates in the 1980s, Césarman adopted a global 
perspective, and encouraged Mexicans to think the same way. 
While Césarman’s dire warnings may have come off as depressing, many stories 
reported reforestation campaigns across Mexico as events to be celebrated. Excélsior 
reported in October 1983 that SEDUE had launched a program to plant trees along a 
forty-five kilometer stretch of highway in the state of Puebla. The author noted that the 
effort will “recuperate areas damaged by pollution, as well as the soils, [it will] protect 
the roads from washouts, diminish noise and permit the recharging of aquifers in 
agricultural areas.”131 Many of these notifications appeared in the newspapers in news 
brief form, more like announcements than actual stories. Such stories included the 
planting of 2,000 trees in the tourist district of North Beach in Playa del Carmen, 500,000 
trees in Iztacalco, 50,000 trees in the Desierto de los Leones, 30,000 shrubs in Santa 
Cecilia Tepetlapa to celebrate the Day of the Tree, and an investment by the Iztapalapa 
delegation of 107 million pesos to reforest riparian areas and road medians in 
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Iztapalapa.132 The sheer number of these types of stories suggests that Mexican readers 
liked reading about the planting of trees, and that the local or federal governments 
undertaking the reforestation campaigns used newspapers to promote them. 
Environmental reporters, government administrators, and university researchers 
contributed forest narratives describing links between deforestation and environmental 
damage extending beyond the obvious loss of trees. By explaining to readers problems 
like the loss of water resources, erosion, reduced ecosystem diversity, and increased air 
pollution, these environmental advocates urged their fellow citizens to value the forest 
rather than the trees. Likewise, stories describing reforestation activity established links 
between forests and environmental renewal. And as the following section argues, some 
government-friendly reporters frequently promoted the government as the organization 
leading the charge for environmental solutions. 
Government as the Solution to Irrational Forestry 
Mexico’s federal government also contributed to the national conversation 
unfolding in the newspapers concerning the fate of Mexico’s forests, with PRI 
spokespeople consistently promoting the idea that the solution resided within official 
government channels. Furthermore, the De la Madrid administration cultivated a 
paternalistic, peasant-friendly image that claimed Mexico’s forests could simultaneously 
lift campesinos out of poverty through rational harvesting and still be safeguarded against 
environmental destruction. This response resonates with that of government reactions to 
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air pollution, which also promoted the federal government as the environmentally-
friendly arbiter, a champion of clean air. However, the government’s effort to explain the 
privatization of ejido-owned forests as an environmentally driven decision – rather than a 
revenue-generating measure consistent with the neoliberal turn – assumed a degree of 
deception not seen in its campaign to persuade Mexicans that it was improving air 
quality. 
Convincing Mexicans that the federal government could prevent future irrational 
logging was one narrative used to establish government environmental credibility. A 
report issued in 1984 by León Jorge Castaño, the Forest Undersecretary for SARH, 
warned that more land was deforested in 1983 than in any other year of Mexico’s history. 
Despite the grim news, Jorge Castaño explained that Mexicans need not worry because, 
“that which occurred last year would not happen again, since one billion pesos will be 
allocated from the federal budget…in order to prevent these problems.”133 Jorge Castaño 
did not reveal the details of how this money would translate into forest protection, he 
simply noted that since the federal government was throwing money at the problem, the 
issue would be resolved. 
A similar narrative came from a different administrator at SARH when asked 
about the threat erosion posed to Mexican forests. José Ignacio Navarro González, the 
General Director of Soil and Water Conservation, explained that previous government 
policies failed to address soil conservation in logged regions, but now the federal 
government “has allocated six billion pesos to the conservation of soil and water and two 
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billion more to the rehabilitation of arid regions.”134 Once again, the government 
spokesman failed to specify how this money would be utilized in the fight against 
logging-induced environmental degradation, but he assured the reader that federal money 
would solve the problem. 
While the previous examples were vague, SARH provided a more detailed 
description of a rational forest use plan in Quintana Roo, describing their Pilot Forest 
Program as a solution to illegal logging both from campesinos and corporations. After 
describing the destruction of tropical forests in Quintana Roo over the last thirty years, an 
unnamed reporter for Uno Más Uno explained that the Pilot Forest Program “aims to end 
irregularities in the concessioning of forest areas and in the monitoring and surveillance 
of activities.”135 Furthermore, the program “had incorporated ten thousand campesinos 
from eleven ejidos” who would be instructed in rational forest use for the harvest of 
“mahogany, cedar, and twelve other forest species considered common.”136 In other 
words, not only was the federal government going to prevent future ecological damage in 
this already environmentally degraded state, but it would also instruct campesinos in how 
to sustainably harvest their forests so that they could continue to generate wealth from 
them for years to come. Implicit in this plan was the idea that dry tropical forests could be 
sustainably logged at all, a dubious notion considering the physiographical characteristics 
of the jungle. In any case, this story clearly presented the future of logging in Quintana 
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Roo as a win-win scenario, aiming to please both environmentalists and those concerned 
with social justice. In fact, the only losers in this article were the logging corporations, 
who were now going to face more oversight from SARH. 
While government spokespeople promoted cash infusions and increased 
government oversight for forest crisis management, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno also 
communicated the federal government’s forest privatization plan as the key to a rational, 
environmentally-friendly forest policy. In 1986, the Federal Government introduced a 
new forestry code that authorized ejidos to consult private logging firms to harvest their 
trees, rather than forcing them to go through the Mexican National Forest Service as they 
had in the past.137 The idea of transferring more control to campesinos appeared in a 
Congressional discussion (and a newspaper article covering it) two years prior, 
intermingled with visions of ecological sensitivity:  “We want to introduce the concept of 
multiple use forests and their rational exploitation, in order to avoid such strict closures, 
that were established politically in the actual law, that are conducive to forest 
destruction.”138  This statement, made by Horacio García Aguilar, the director of SARH, 
argued that forest service regulations that limited campesino forest use (such as forest 
closures that prevented harvesting) actually encouraged forest destruction, and that more 
campesino control would give rise to more responsible forest management among the 
peasants who owned the forests. 
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García Aguilar went on to tie the future of rational forest management to more 
campesino input, claiming, “the results of these formal consultation meetings on 
environmental legislation should be fully complemented by meetings with authentic 
campesino organizations across the country.”139 Although the specifics of the forestry 
reform being discussed at this congressional hearing in 1984 were not revealed in the 
article, a clear link exists between the themes under discussion and the 1986 forestry law 
giving campesinos the power to deal with private corporations. Therefore, this 
progression of increasing campesino agency regarding forestry decisions dovetails into 
the forestry privatization efforts introduced in 1986 as President De la Madrid’s 
administration embraced neoliberal reforms in an attempt to reduce government costs. 
A follow-up story written a week later (also by Teresa Weiser) revealed some of 
the details of the proposed reforms to the forestry law, and once again, a government 
spokesperson couched increased privatization and campesino control as the 
environmentally conscious decision. León Jorge Castaños, the Forest Undersecretary for 
SARH, explained that the reforms to the forestry law “anticipate that the technical studies 
for the use of forest resources may be developed by SARH personnel, but also by 
professionals or by the owners or possessors of the resource, provided they have proof of 
an evaluation of its exploitable capacity.”140 In other words, the law would make it easier 
for campesinos to contract private logging corporations to harvest their forest resources. 
Jorge Castaños continued with an assurance that SARH would also address “forest 
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vigilance” in the new law: “state and local governments should contribute, regarding 
audits, environmental strategy and the assessment of results in the ecological efforts.”141 
The reform essentially delegated environmental oversight to local and state governments, 
further reducing federal expenditures. While Jorge Castaños argued that these reforms 
would provide for environmental protection, in reality many municipal and state 
government budgets were ill-equipped to handle the extra expenditures.142 As a result, 
neoliberal decentralization policies like this one turned out to be a net loss for the quality 
of Mexico’s environment. Nevertheless, these articles demonstrate that government 
administrators presented forestry reform as a way to safeguard the environment while 
simultaneously enriching the poor.143 
These articles from Excélsior and Uno Más Uno demonstrate that in 1983 and 
1984 the federal government’s longstanding complex relationship with forests was 
becoming even stranger. Its desire for neoliberal land reforms clashed with the PRI’s 
traditional patrimonial role as protector of the forests, and so a contradictory message of 
environmentally-friendly privatization appeared as a way to wed the PRI’s patrimonial 
past with its neoliberal future. So the government’s environmental narrative promoted its 
handing over of forests to local power brokers as the right choice for the environment and 
the campesino. Administrators also promoted federal financial investments into forest 
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protection programs, like the Pilot Forest Program in Quintana Roo, to boost its 
credibility as champion of the forest.  
In the sample analyzed for this thesis, reporters wrote stories about forests more 
frequently than any other topic besides water crises, and the quantity of these stories 
suggests that Excélsior and Uno Más Uno directors thought readers wanted to read them. 
This belief permitted a diverse discourse of environmental narratives concerning forests. 
Environmentalists, represented in newspapers by journalists, researchers, and 
campesinos, contributed forest narratives which tried to make the case that deforestation 
was out of control and the negative impacts associated with it damaged both economic 
prosperity and ecosystems. Wise-use conservationists, such as Raul Olmedo, and federal 
government administrators, argued that Mexico’s forests held valuable resources that 
could be exploited in a way that was sustainable or racional. Furthermore, they argued 
that the ejido land-holding system prevented sustainable use, and that the privatization of 
forest resources could better contribute to the national economy while also lifting 
campesinos out of poverty and providing better environmental protection of forests. Both 
sides connected the future of forests to the future of Mexico in a visceral manner, and 
promoted their particular philosophy as the best path forward. 
While it is difficult to quantify the impact these narratives had on the 
development of Mexico’s forest policy, and on efforts to protect forest environments, it is 
possible to suggest some of its effects. By consistently reporting on issues like 
deforestation, corporate and government collusion to log forests illegally, and the proper 
role of the campesino in forest management, environmental journalists kept the pressure 
on government administrators to address the destruction of the nation’s forests. At the 
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same time, government spokespeople used newspapers to persuade readers that 
permitting campesinos to deal directly with private forest managers and companies was 
the correct way to address these very issues.  
Today, forest destruction continues apace as the Federal Government’s 
decentralization of forest management cleared the way for logging by drug cartels and 
environmentalists from all social classes continue to fight against illegal logging.144 
Although the federal government succeeded in passing its forest reforms, the economic 
crisis limited its ability to fully fund campesino community forestry programs. So while 
environmental reporting did not prevent unsustainable deforestation, it did raise 
awareness among Mexicans about the dangers of disrupting an environment, even if it 
was far away from where most people lived. In the next chapter we will explore the 
environmental narrative of a much more tangible resource for the people of Mexico: 
water.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“The Neglect is Criminal:” Water Crises and Environmental Reporting 
Life was already challenging for the residents of Los Reyes Iztacala neighborhood 
in Tlalnepantla (located in the Valley of Mexico), many of whom lived outside – either 
under the branches of the local pirul trees or in dwellings along the railroad tracks 
constructed from whatever could be scrounged – but the persistent inundations of 
industrial wastewater and city sewage into their living spaces proved to be the breaking 
point in the summer of 1983. The frequent downpours of the wet season overwhelmed 
the city’s sewer system, and the excess water not only flooded out these squatters, it also 
contaminated the drinking water of 125,000 people in Los Reyes. Tired of the persistent 
inundations and fearful of an epidemic, residents turned to their local grassroots 
organization, the Board of Citizen Participation, to appeal to Alfonso Olvera Reyes, their 
mayor, to stop the flooding. In response, residents claimed, Olvera Reyes hired shock 
brigades (brigadas de choque) to make death threats in an effort to shut them up. With 
nowhere else to turn, the Board of Citizen Participation took their story to Excélsior. On 
5 September, 1983, Mexicans across the country could read the tale of corruption and 
neglect centered around water pollution,  subtitled “The neglect is criminal.”145 
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Journalists wrote more stories about water than any other environmental topic, 
and the geographic scope of these stories encompassed every region of Mexico.146 Based 
on the sheer number of stories reporting on events which jeopardized the purity or supply 
of water, it is clear that environmental journalists viewed water crises as some of 
Mexico’s most pressing environmental issues, and that Excélsior and Uno Más Uno 
directors believed these issues to be popular among readers. Journalists served as public 
educators by informing readers of threats to their health and quality of life caused by 
water crises. Furthermore, they served as public watchdogs by blaming water crises on 
those entities they believed responsible for causing them. At the same time, government 
spokespeople and government-friendly journalists crafted narratives which served to 
defend the federal government and convince the public that it was working to mitigate the 
numerous water crises across the country. 
Just like with air pollution, then, news stories from this sample demonstrate that 
most reporters covering water crises served as public watchdogs and educators, but about 
twenty percent of these environmental narratives worked to deflect criticism aimed at the 
federal government and to promote policies supported by the PRI. The first section 
analyzes narratives fitting the educator role used by environmentalists to link water 
pollution or water shortages with unpleasant phenomena, such as illness or a reduced 
quality of life. By drawing these connections and explaining the proximate causes behind 
water crises, they hoped to educate readers about what they saw as an acute national 
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crisis – the security of their water. The next section analyzes narratives fitting the 
watchdog role, in which reporters and their sources blamed some entity for causing a 
water crisis. In blaming someone, the denouncer aimed to focus public anger onto 
specific groups of people, either to encourage action against them or to deflect anger 
away from oneself. The final section analyzes narratives which defended the federal 
government’s handling of water crises.147 These stories promoted the government as the 
champion of the people, and tried to convince readers that government administrators 
were the best route for the redress of environmental water crises.  
Describing Mexico’s Water Problems 
While most readers likely understood that water pollution and water shortages 
could have negative impacts on their lives, environmental journalists endeavored to 
describe in detail the litany of maladies brought about by a compromised water supply. 
Chief among them was the increase in disease caused by contaminated water, but 
journalists also described the loss of revenue driven by dwindling aquifers, and garbage-
filled tourist areas. Other journalists described how water pollution threatened non-
human species. Taken as a whole, the description of Mexico’s many water crises by 
environmental journalists demonstrates an attempt not just to educate, but also to 
advocate for environmental responsibility. 
Outbreaks of gastrointestinal diseases were frequent across the country, and 
journalists filed many stories documenting these epidemics and linking them with water 
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Appendix. 
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pollution from sewage or industrial wastewater.148 Reporter Gustavo Rodríguez consulted 
representatives from Project Green (Proyecto Verde), a non-governmental environmental 
organization, to connect an outbreak of skin and gastrointestinal diseases in the San Luis 
Potosí community of Rascón with the industrial wastes flowing through the city’s main 
drinking water canal.149 Similarly, reporter Joaquín Paredes relied on the medical 
expertise of Dr. Raymundo Verduzco Rossan to link an outbreak of salmonella in 
Saltillo, Coahuila, with vegetables irrigated with sewage from two local industries, 
Zincamex and Cibiosa.150 On August 4, 1983, Maximino Rodríguez filed a story about 
how a shipwreck loaded with spoiled tuna and sardines contaminated the Gulf of 
California, causing those who caught fish in the vicinity of the shipwreck to get sick.151 
These three examples demonstrate the variety of ways in which contaminated water 
sickened Mexicans (either directly from the canal, by washing vegetables with 
contaminated water, or by leaving spoiled food in a shallow sea near a city), but they also 
show how reporters educated their readers of the wide-ranging circumstances by which 
polluted water could find its way inside their bodies. 
Polluted water also found its way across the country. Thanks to a man-made 
drainage canal, the raw sewage from thirteen million people living in the Valley of 
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Mexico drained to the Gulf of Mexico via Hidalgo, and reporter Rodolfo Wong wrote a 
story about how this export of waste impacted the small town of Mixtiahuala, Hidalgo. 
He interviewed Rafael Aguirre, an ejido member who told him that decades of Valley of 
Mexico waste had saturated the soil and drinking water, and explained that “many 
children come to bathe in this place [the Tula River, the primary drainage for the Valley 
of Mexico], because of that we fear epidemics of skin and gastrointestinal illnesses. [We] 
have also recorded isolated deaths.”152 Wong’s story encouraged Valley of Mexico 
residents think about the consequences of not properly treating the city’s waste. 
Other reporters educated the public about water pollution through shorter news 
briefs. Usually no longer than a paragraph, these quick descriptions gave readers the 
basic information about a problem without requiring the longer investment of time 
needed to read a full story. Reporter Alfredo Ibarra wrote a news brief in September 1983 
about an outbreak of typhoid and other gastrointestinal illnesses in Cuernavaca, Morelos, 
in which 90,000 people, sixty percent of the city’s population, were ill. Although the 
story was short, he made sure to note that doctors blamed the epidemic on the 
contamination of drinking water due to the deterioration of the city’s water pipes.153 In 
May 1984, 11,627 people, most of whom were children, suffered from gastroenteritis in 
Guerrero due in part to contaminated water. Reporter Salomón García filed the news 
brief, noting that nine cities (Acapulco, Chilpancingo, Taxco, Iguala, Huitzuco, 
Zihuatanejo, Tlapa, Chilapa, and Ciudad Altamirano) reported instances of the 
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epidemic.154 Another news brief in that same month warned residents of Naucalpan, 
Atizapán, and Tlalnepantla (the city where residents of  Los Reyes neighborhood faced 
death threats from their mayor) that eight polluted streams in the northwestern Valley of 
Mexico threatened to spark epidemics of infectious diseases due to their high levels of 
pollution.155 With concise stories like these, reporters kept the dangers of water pollution 
on the radar for time-pressed readers. 
Unfortunately for Mexicans, organic pollutants were not the only water-borne 
threats. Environmental journalists in this sample also wrote stories about the risks posed 
by industrial chemicals like lead, chromium, or mercury, and communicated to readers 
just how deadly they could be. Two environmental reporters, Teresa Weiser and Jesús 
Lastra, teamed up for a pair of stories covering what they called an “environmental 
disaster” in the Coatzacoalcos River in Veracruz in April 1984. They explained that the 
river was contaminated with hydrocarbons, lead, mercury, cyanide, ammonia, detergents, 
fecal residue, and gypsum, resulting in great health risks for those who drank or ate 
anything from it.156 In the second story they focused on lead in the blood of citizens of 
Coatzacoalcos, of which over half had elevated levels. The reporters interviewed medical 
doctor Aura Judith Pérez Zapata, who explained that lead in the blood “produces a high 
number of miscarriages, as well as weakness, [and] physiological deformations. Also, it 
has been confirmed that it affects the central nervous system, the cerebellum, the spinal 
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cord, and motor and sensory nerves.”157 After listing these terrifying lead poisoning 
maladies, Weiser and Lastra revealed that a recent biochemical analysis found that forty-
three percent of the species in the Coatzacoalcos River tested positive for lead. The 
alarming tone of their article encouraged Coatzacoalcans to fear their own rivers. Such 
was the power of descriptive environmental reporting. 
Several reporters educated readers about the tendency for industrial wastewater 
problems to spring up along the margins of the country. One reporter for Excélsior 
focused on the oceans, noting the pollution problem from industries, cities, and even 
tourism. This unnamed reporter interviewed José Luis Calderón Bertheneuf, the Director 
of Water Pollution Control and Prevention for SEDUE, who explained that lead and 
mercury flowing in Mexico’s rivers changed the characteristics of the ocean and the 
creatures who lived in it.158 Reporter Fausto Fernandez Ponte wrote a story about the 
dangers posed by maquiladoras along the United States border. Based on a study 
conducted by researchers from the College of Mexico in Tijuana, Baja California, the 
article described how these poorly regulated industrial complexes dumped very 
dangerous toxic wastes into rivers along the border. Fernandez Ponte noted that some of 
these chemicals were known to cause cancer.159 Both of these articles demonstrated a 
desire to bring attention to the nation’s frontiers, and made a special point to describe the 
difficulties of regulating toxic pollution in regions far from the capital. 
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 While some regions suffered from disproportionate water pollution due to their 
remoteness, some social groups suffered undue water pollution because of their low 
status in society, and environmental journalists educated readers of their plight. In an 
exposé, reporter Mario García Sordo described cases of intoxication from pesticides in 
the water supply among migrant workers in the Culiacán Valley of Sinaloa.160 In the 
article Sordo wrote that the workers “suffer from poisonings because the employers deny 
them potable water and they must resort to the canals in order to satisfy their basic needs. 
It is precisely the water of the irrigation canals that carries the toxic waste from the 
various pesticides that come together to cause serious harm to humans…In the canals 
they wash their children, their dishes, and their clothes, and they also go to the canals to 
fill up their pails of drinking water.”161 This was not a water issue that directly impacted 
most readers. Instead, García Sordo’s report documented for his readers the exploitation 
of their fellow citizens, living on the margins of society. 
Describing illnesses or epidemics was not the only method environmental 
journalists undertook to educate their readers about water crises, they also reported on 
water problems that reduced Mexicans’ quality of life. Foremost among this approach 
were stories warning of dwindling water supplies across the country. Just as Mexico City 
exported its sewage to other regions of the country (as we saw in the case of Mixtiahuala, 
Hidalgo), it also imported clean water (essentially exporting water shortages to the Lerma 
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and Cutzamala basins) to satisfy the thirst of the valley’s eighteen million residents, 
whose aquifer continued to dwindle throughout the decade.162 
At the same time, reporters writing about the arid northwest raised concerns over 
the aquifer’s ability to recharge the debt incurred by thirsty cities and irrigation demands. 
Javier Cruz wrote a story about the overexploitation of groundwater in Ensenada, Baja 
California, and quoted the Director of the Ministry of Agriculture (SARH) who blamed 
the problem on campesinos drilling too many wells.163 This theme, in which the 
government blamed poorly-managed environmental exploitation on ignorant peasants, 
mirrors the case of irrational forest use by campesinos seen in chapter two. Elviro Muro 
H. interviewed a geologist from National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), 
Mario Cabra Pérez, who described the nationwide water shortages found in Hermosillo, 
Sonora, Baja California, and Mexico City, and suggested a ban on the drilling of new 
water wells.164 Joaquín Paredes also raised concerns over the loss of water in a news brief 
explaining that every day, forty percent of Saltillo, Coahuila’s water was lost due to 
overexploitation, lack of system maintenance, and illegal well drilling.165 In this case, the 
government shared the blame with the campesinos for wasting water. All of these stories 
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projected a foreboding tone, suggesting that without water, economies, societies, and 
lifestyles would change for the worse. 
While some reporters fretted over dwindling aquifers, Marta Anaya lamented the 
loss of scenic beauty among the canals of Xochimilco, one of Mexico’s most popular 
tourist destinations. In a report filed for Excélsior, Anaya described the abundance of 
garbage and aquatic weeds “that have become the companions” of the canals. Describing 
her boat trip through Xochimilco she wrote,” and so one sees it coming [the water], 
carrying trash. Gradually the boats go by. They navigate between a kind of green cream, 
which floats the backwaters.”166 Describing her trip as a kind of expedition, Anaya 
juxtaposed the common narrative of an explorer journeying through a natural place with 
the unappealing qualities of a garbage dump. This perverted excursion highlighted the 
disparity between what once existed, and the realities of the present, projecting a great 
sense of loss to the reader. 
Even though the environmental threats to humans were many, some reporters 
devoted newsprint to educating readers of the dangers water pollution posed to non-
human species. José Castañeda Carrillo, the president of a fishing cooperative near La 
Vega dam in Jalisco complained to reporter Eduardo Chimely that wastewater from a 
local sugar refinery threatened fish in the river.167 Similarly, representatives from Project 
Green in the Huasteca region of San Luis Potosí told reporter Gustavo Rodríguez that 
they found genetic mutations in animals living in local rivers. Since the early twentieth 
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century this region had experienced repeated oil spills due to poorly regulated drilling.168 
Gustavo Rodríguez explained the danger this legacy posed to local fauna, and noted the 
special peril they encountered with the excessively polluted Valles River: “Any animal 
that drinks water in this area dies instantly due to the high degree of acid, oil, lye, and 
other toxic substances in the river.”169 While the report noted the dangers this river posed 
to people, that it also expressed concern for the ecosystem demonstrates that reporters 
tried to educate readers about threats that did not directly impact their health. 
In addition to educating readers about lacustrine and riparian life, reporters from 
this sample also raised red flags over the threats posed to marine life. Javier Cruz filed 
two stories in September 1983 about water pollution off the coast of Baja California. The 
features dealt with a loss of marine life due to industrial waste from both the United 
States and Mexico. The first story noted how the California current carried chromium, 
lead, and pesticides from California south to the coast of Baja California where it 
damaged fish populations.170 The following week Cruz wrote a story describing a 
fourteen hectare dead zone in the Bay of Todos los Santos in Ensenada, Baja California, 
due to the city’s industrial waste.171 Teresa Weiser, covering the National Environmental 
Congress in May 1984, relayed the environmental discussions of the nation’s power 
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brokers who viewed desertification and the pollution of Mexico’s rivers and seas as the 
most challenging problems. But despite the focus on these issues, Weiser still found room 
to mention the launch of a campaign of awareness to protect endangered species such as 
the sea turtle.172 At a time when the nation’s economy was flagging and millions lived in 
poverty, these issues might have been ignored. But Mexican journalists demonstrated an 
empathy for wildlife, and described water crises from the animals’ point of view, 
simultaneously educating their readers about what they were losing with this reduced 
quality of life. 
Affixing Blame for Water Crises 
Excélsior and Uno Más Uno reporters in 1983 and 1984 also served as public 
watchdogs, affixing blame for environmental water crises upon a host of guilty parties 
ranging all across the social spectrum. Environmental journalists challenged the rhetoric 
of industrial corporations and federal, state, and local governments, suggesting that 
problems with the nation’s water supply stemmed from their collective apathy and 
incompetence. Less frequent accusations named foreign governments for bringing 
pollution to Mexico, and the Mexican people as a whole for lacking an environmental 
conscience.173 Just as describing water crises in terms of their proximate causes and 
deleterious impacts helped readers to understand the science behind the natural forces 
that threatened their health or livelihoods, naming the people whose actions caused water 
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crises empowered readers. Once people know who is threatening their water supply, they 
can choose to demonstrate against them. By naming those parties they believed to be 
guilty, environmental journalists and their sources attempted to turn readers against these 
parties, thereby sharing with them the onus of civic action. 
More often than not, if a reporter or source blamed industrial callousness for 
provoking a water crisis, they would name the specific corporation or plant causing the 
problem. In a story about industrial pollution in the Blanco River, Teresa Weiser wrote: 
“With a high content of organic and solid material, the industrial waste within the Blanco 
River watershed not only wreaks environmental havoc in the region, but also continually 
deposits sediment in the hydroelectric plants installed along the river, which reduces the 
capacity of the dams and deteriorates the equipment used in the production of energy.”174 
She then named the Moctezuma Brewery, the Kimberly-Clark paper mill, and two 
chemical companies called Proquina and Mexicana de Alcaloides as the largest 
contributors of pollution to the river. In a news story written by Roberto Sosa, a small 
town mayor accused a glass manufacturer of damaging the city’s aquifer. Victor López 
Nassar explained to Sosa that Materias Primas de Monterrey had done irreparable harm 
to their drinking water, but only paid the city two and a half pesos for every ton of 
material it removed.175 The mayor told Sosa that they had requested an intervention into 
the matter by the state government. Both of these examples demonstrate a willingness to 
point fingers at specific corporations. As we saw in chapter one, Weiser was not shy 
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about naming those she believed guilty for polluting the atmosphere, so it is not 
surprising that she used this tactic in shaming polluters of the hydrosphere as well. López 
Nassar, in his efforts to secure state intervention against Materias Primas, likely used the 
newspaper as a way to generate public outcry against the glass manufacturer. In both 
cases, the strategy of blaming specific industries in the newspaper was meant to initiate 
processes that would end the pollution. 
Accusations against industrial polluters indicate a concerted effort by journalists 
to bring national attention to flagrant violations of environmental law, and the resulting 
risks to human health. When water pollution damaged 5,000 hectares of ejido land in 
Jalisco in August 1983, members of the local agricultural committee contributed a 
narrative which publicly denounced the mining company Peña Colorada for dumping 
mineral wastes into the Maravasco River.176 When an outbreak of salmonella hit Saltillo, 
Coahuila, in September 1983, medical doctor Raymundo Verduzco Rossan used the 
newspaper to urge authorities to punish two Mexican businesses, Zincamex and Cibiosa, 
for releasing their sewage into the city’s irrigation water.177 In April 1984, Teresa Weiser 
and Jesús Lastra filed an exposé on the ecological damage in the Coatzacoalcos River 
near Coatzacoalcos, Veracruz, blaming Pemex for dumping hydrocarbons and oil and 
Fertimex for discharging high quantities of calcium and acid directly into the river.178 
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While it is hard to know quantitatively how much these kinds of public 
accusations translated into civic action, the number of people demonstrating for 
environmental causes increased as the decade continued. Jordi Díez and several other 
historians and political scientists have suggested that high profile environmental disasters 
such as the 1984 San Juan Ixhuatepec gas explosion, the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, 
and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster served as rallying points around which 
environmentalist causes could grow.179 But by covering these demonstrations, reporters 
gave rise to a positive feedback loop in which more stories about environmental 
demonstrations gave rise to more environmental demonstration participation as citizens 
learned what their countrymen were doing. 
A pair of stories written by reporter Gustavo Rodríguez in May 1984 provides 
evidence for this relationship between environmental stories and environmental 
demonstrations. His news brief from May 18 described plans for a demonstration led by 
environmental group Project Green (Proyecto Verde) against a Mexican business called 
Fibracel and six other sugar refineries along the Valles River in San Luis Potosí.180 While 
the group spokesman Pedro Medellín estimated they would see a turnout of about 10,000 
people at the demonstration, Rodríguez’s news brief from two days later covering the 
demonstration noted that more than 12,500 people showed up. The group held a symbolic 
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closure of Fibracel, and Project Green called on SEDUE to prevent future pollution.181 
While an increased attendance of 2,500 demonstrators is not overwhelming evidence that 
the newspaper brought more people to the protest, it was still a twenty-five percent 
increase over what they expected to receive. 
Denouncements of the government for creating water crises were just as popular 
as denouncements of industries among environmental journalists serving as public 
watchdogs. Some claimed the government was itself degrading the environment, others 
accused the government of failing to enforce environmental laws, and still others accused 
the government of failing to establish adequate environmental protection policies. As 
noted in the introduction to this chapter with the sewage problems in Los Reyes 
neighborhood, sometimes Mexicans could not count on the government to redress their 
water issues. But by taking their plight to the newspaper, citizens could apply pressure on 
government administrators that they would not otherwise have been able to muster. At 
the same time, journalists with an environmental orientation worked to apply this same 
pressure to generate the environmental action they wished to bring about. 
Most of the stories that accused the government of actively contributing to water 
pollution were directed at nationalized industries, such as Pemex. In September 1983, 
Mario Ruiz R. described the many measures Pemex had taken to reduce its environmental 
footprint in the Coatzacoalcos River and the Gulf of Mexico, but explained that the 
nationalized oil refinery in Coatzacoalcos still discharged its waste into the region’s 
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water.182 In this case, the reporter softened the blow by describing Pemex’s 
environmental investment, but still accused it of damaging a water supply. By mentioning 
the government’s efforts to rehabilitate the environment, Ruiz described a government 
working to mitigate a difficult crisis. In July 1984, the mayor of Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, 
Jorge Camacho Cabrera, also lobbed accusations of environmental contamination at 
Pemex. Camacho Cabrera claimed that Pemex did not have “adequate equipment for 
preventing pollution, plus it did not inform anyone about a spill of 300,000 liters of diesel 
that caused environmental damage in the vicinity of the town and the beaches.”183 In this 
case, a local government administrator accused a higher branch of government for 
causing a water crisis that affected his city. Camacho Cabrera and Ruiz worked together 
through newsprint to apply pressure to the government hoping for an end to the pollution. 
The most prevalent form of government criticism concerning water crises in this 
sample consisted of accusing the government of failing to enforce environmental laws.184 
When residents of the Santiago Acahualtepec neighborhood in Mexico City complained 
to their municipal government that their drinking water was orange and brown and filled 
with garbage and red worms (gusanos rojos), authorities told them their water was 
fine.185 So they took their story to Uno Más Uno in an attempt to pressure government 
administrators to fix the problem. When a lack of maintenance on three government-run 
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water treatment plants resulted in pollution in the Balsas River in Michoacan, local 
alderman Jacobo Díaz Ortega made sure the newspaper knew that the federal government 
was failing to enforce its own water-quality laws.186  When water service unexpectedly 
shut down in Culiacan during a heat wave, resulting in thirty children being treated for 
dehydration, reporter Carlos Velázquez informed readers that neither the Board of 
Drinking Water and Sewage nor municipal authorities could explain the outage, and 
neither intervened to relieve problems associated with the shortage.187 When open canals 
carrying sewage from Mexico City threatened the inhabitants of Mixtiahuala, Hidalgo, a 
local ejido commissary, Rafael Aguirre, accused state delegates, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and the Ministry of Health of not fulfilling their promises to install 
underground sewage pipes through the community.188 All of these examples describe 
attempts by Mexican citizens to hold their government accountable on issues surrounding 
water quality and environmental regulation. They were not even asking for new laws, 
they merely wanted their government to follow the laws it had already legislated by 
providing its citizens with clean drinking water. 
 Journalists also described government environmental policy failures. In a story 
about some of the environmental problems impacting the Valley of Mexico, reporter 
Alicia Ortiz noted the lack of sewer service for nearly five million inhabitants. She 
interviewed Jorge González Torres, a member of the Mexican Environmental Alliance, 
                                                 
186 "Aguas residuales contaminan el Balsas," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), Jul. 7, 1984. 
187 Carlos Velázquez, "Carecieron de agua durante dos días," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, 
Mexico), May 14, 1984. 
188 Rodolfo Wong, "Nada hace SSA por remediar la contaminación de aguas negras," Excélsior 
(Mexico City, Mexico), Sep. 12, 1983. 
102 
 
 
 
who argued that the federal government had not shown any interest in diminishing the 
impacts of pollution and that “vested interests hinder any possible solutions.”189  As an 
example of this he noted “the constant urban growth, promoted by large residential 
constructions that, authorized by the government, little by little have been destroying [the 
valley’s] green spaces.”  González Torres blamed the federal government’s decades-long 
centralization policy for giving rise to many of the environmental and health problems 
afflicting residents in the Valley of Mexico.  
In a similar manner, Alejandro Rosales Jiménez, the environmental manager for 
the city of Orizaba, told Teresa Weiser that industrial development gave rise to a 
mutually beneficial economic relationship between local workers and local governments 
which encouraged neglect for water supplies, like that occurring in his city’s Blanco 
River. He explained that “there is a kind of mutual blackmail between representatives of 
capital and labor and the game of concessions in different branches, all in contempt of 
sound public administration for the benefit of communities.190 In other words, Rosales 
Jiménez believed the links between government, business, and labor had been corrupted 
to a point to which the very political structure of Mexico could not address the nation’s 
most pressing environmental concerns. In a way, this was the ultimate policy failure in 
that the basic method by which the Mexican government did business prevented the 
government from fulfilling its role as champion of the people it governed. 
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(Mexico City, Mexico), Jul. 9, 1984. 
190 Teresa Weiser, "Contaminación del río Blanco y azolvamiento en plantas hidroeléctricas por 
los desechos sólidos," Uno Más Uno (Mexico City, Mexico), Apr. 30, 1984. 
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Some journalists accused foreign nations of polluting the waters of Mexico, either 
from ocean currents or through the foreign-owned industries established in their country. 
Fausto Fernandez Ponte reported on a study conducted by the College of Mexico that 
found that maquiladoras were dangerous places to work and that they dumped very 
dangerous wastes into rivers along the border with the United States. The story had 
plenty of blame to go around – accusing maquiladora plants in general for industrial 
neglect and the Mexican government for failing to properly regulate these border 
industries – but they placed the majority of the blame on foreign nations like the United 
States or Japan who had constructed the plants to take advantage of Mexico’s cheap 
labor. Clearly, the United States and Japanese governments were not operating these 
maquiladoras, rather it was businesses based in those countries. But the article did not 
make this distinction, instead referring to “maquiladora plants of the United States, Japan, 
and other countries.”191 This phrasing clearly meant to accuse the economic policies of 
these nations that encouraged the simultaneous exploitation of Mexican labor and 
degradation of Mexican water. In the very same week, reporter Javier Cruz filed a short 
story about research conducted by Catsuo Nichicawa, who found that the United States 
polluted the Pacific Ocean with chromium, lead, and insecticides, which the California 
current then carried south to Baja California where it damaged fish populations.192 In 
both of these stories, reporters presented a foreign government as guilty of damaging 
Mexico’s water, thereby shifting blame away from Mexicans. 
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A fourth group that journalists tended to blame for water crises were Mexican 
citizens in general, who some reporters characterized as lacking in environmental 
awareness. For example, in a story announcing the construction of three new water 
treatment plants designed to help clean up Lake Chapala, the manager of the Jalisco 
Public Works Department, Manuel Gómez Garza, explained that “the federal government 
would promise to control the industrial waste deposited in the water if state authorities 
would try to prevent local residents from throwing trash in the lake.”193 While some 
locals probably did use the lake as a dumping ground, the federal government, in 
promoting heavy industrial development in the headwaters of the Lerma River basin, of 
which Lake Chapala was a part, deserved most of the blame for the lake’s deteriorating 
condition. But the story presented the government as the protector of the lake, and 
described local Mexicans as ignorant yokels incapable of environmental foresight. 
Moreover, blaming the locals shifted blame from the government-encouraged industrial 
complex 470 miles upstream. 
Blaming the citizens for the loss of water resources was a popular theme in the 
pages of Excélsior during in 1983, a trend that is explained by its tendency to deflect 
blame away from the federal government due to its government-friendly staff. A 
September 1983 story consulted many different government administrators in a 
discussion of the barriers to environmental regulation and pollution prevention. Enrique 
Gastélum Ramos, the General Director of Water Use and Prevention of Pollution for 
SARH, explained that “there exists an absolute lack of awareness among ordinary 
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citizens towards the conservation and protection of natural resources.”194 Another story 
described a SARH-imposed ban on the drilling of new water wells in Ensenada, Baja 
California, in order to prevent the overexploitation of the region’s groundwater. 
Campesinos who broke this law would be fined 50,000 pesos.195 In this story, the 
government stepped in to safeguard a precious resource from the short-sighted 
campesinos who had foolishly wasted the region’s groundwater. Again, both of these 
stories described the Mexican government as the enforcer of the environmental foresight 
the citizens of Mexico seemed to lack. 
The Government as Protector of Water Resources 
Within the sample, government-friendly reporters and government spokespeople 
pushed environmental narratives which presented the federal government as the 
champion of environmentalism, and deflected blame for water crises to other entities. 
This chapter revealed many examples of citizens calling for government action to address 
water crises. In turn, when the federal government fined corporations for polluting water, 
or spent money on facilities to clean water supplies, it promoted these efforts in Excélsior 
and Uno Más Uno. As political scientist Stephen Mumme has pointed out, President De 
la Madrid promoted an environmental agenda throughout his term as a way to preempt 
any non-governmental environmental criticism.196 The frequent reports of government-
                                                 
194 "Obstruyen barreras legales el combate a la contaminación de tierras y aguas," Excélsior 
(Mexico City, Mexico), Sep. 22, 1983. 
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directed environmental action found in the sample used for this thesis further supports his 
analysis. Stories presenting the government’s perspective presented readers with a very 
different narrative from those crafted by educators and public watchdogs. Instead, these 
narratives asserted that the federal government knew about the nation’s water problems 
and was taking effective action to remedy them. Despite the larger number of stories in 
this sample of water crises written by environmentalists, the federal government 
responded with a similarly proportioned number of stories promoting their counter-
narrative of government environmental sensitivity.197 
One of the federal government’s duties was to enforce environmental standards 
and punish those who did not comply, so when bureaucrats upheld this responsibility they 
used newspapers to promote their actions. An Excélsior story from October 1983 
informed readers that the Ministry of Communications and Transport fined the captains 
and owners of thirty-eight boats caught polluting Mexican seas with food waste, 
packaging, and other garbage.198 This story served as a warning to those who would 
pollute Mexican waterways, but it also conveyed to the reading public a message of 
government authority to regulate environmental issues such as water crises. 
The most popular method by which the federal government promoted its 
environmental proactivity through newspapers in this sample was with the 
announcements of wastewater treatment plant constructions. Two weeks before Teresa 
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Weiser’s story about pollution in the Blanco River in April 1984, a news brief appeared 
in the same paper announcing a study by SEDUE to determine the feasibility of 
constructing a new water treatment plant along the very same river in order to treat the 
pollution and make the water drinkable again.199 The following month, a SEDUE 
spokesmen once again used Uno Más Uno to promote a plan under study that would 
construct twenty new water treatment plants across the country over a six year period, 
thereby reducing national river pollution by seventy-five percent.200 In both of these 
stories, the spokesmen failed to blame any particular industry or city for polluting the 
rivers, they merely stated that the government knew about the problem and technocrats 
were working to solve it. This kind of reporting avoided accusing anyone, and instead 
presented a better future brought about by the federal government. 
Environmental reporters wrote more frequently on water crises than on any other 
environmental issue, and they reported on the subject by educating readers about the 
ways in which water crises negatively impacted them, by serving as public watchdogs 
that accused different groups for causing the pollution, and by defending the federal 
government’s efforts to address the crises. The quantity of these stories suggests that 
Mexican readers in the 1980s worried about water quality and scarcity issues, and wanted 
to know who and what was threatening this vital resource. Furthermore, the quantity of 
stories about the government’s mitigation attempts suggests a smaller, but still culturally 
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significant, attempt by the federal government to reassure readers that they could place 
trust in their nation’s government to protect Mexico’s water supply. 
When compared with the other two environmental issues analyzed in this thesis, 
air pollution and forests, water crisis reporting was the most frequent, and reporters 
presented it with more foreboding urgency than they did stories on the other two issues. 
There certainly were a few editorials and stories about air pollution that warned how 
deadly breathing Mexico City’s air could be, and some reporters presented stories about 
the loss of Mexico’s forests as if a great plague of devastation were sweeping the country, 
but these were limited in number. The sheer quantity of water pollution stories, especially 
the ones reporting on water-borne epidemics and dangerous chemical pollution, suggests 
that reporters viewed water crises as a more immediate, widespread threat to the health of 
Mexicans.  
Given the importance of water to human life and its role as a vector of 
communicable disease, this proliferation of stories concerned with Mexico’s water supply 
is not surprising. Trees were important to the economy and their removal could 
eventually lead to erosion and desertification, but their destruction did not give rise to 
immediate human health concerns. And while breathing the air in Mexico City could be 
deadly, it mostly impacted the city’s sensitive populations such as children or the elderly, 
and usually one needed prolonged exposure in order to get sick. Water was both vital to 
Mexico’s health and an immediate threat to its people, and this explains its popularity as 
an environmental topic.  
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CONCLUSION 
Excélsior, Uno Más Uno, and the Awakening of Mexican Environmentalism 
 “Don’t worry Federico. No matter how it shocks us, we must admit that the 
Revolution tamed Mexico forever.” 
He hadn’t seen the resentful eyes, the caged tigers lurking in the nervous bodies 
of the youths sitting watching the smog drift by.201 
– Carlos Fuentes 
In his short story The Mandarin, Mexican novelist Carlos Fuentes contrasted the 
old and the new Mexico City through the life of Federico, an old man clinging to the 
extravagance, ritual, and beauty of the past even as the growing, polluted, soulless city 
endeavored to destroy any trace of its former charms. The above quote foreshadows a 
violent end to Federico – there is no room for such nonsense in Fuentes’s monstrous, 
modern Mexico City – but, written in the 1970s, it also foreshadowed the rise in 
environmental advocacy of the following decade. Despite attempts by the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) to maintain an acquiescent, controlled, “tame” population, its 
failure to adequately address the nation’s mounting crises, including the environmental 
one, provoked a surge in advocacy documented in the pages of Mexico’s newspapers. 
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This story, along with many of Fuentes’s other works, expressed a disgust with 
what Mexico had become, a disgust reflected in the environmental narratives which many 
other Mexicans contributed to Excélsior and Uno Más Uno in 1983 and 1984. Those 
activists who chose not to sit idly by as industrial corporations and millions of vehicles 
flooded their air and water with poison, and as logging corporations clear cut their forests 
leaving behind degraded landscapes, all with tacit approval from the federal government, 
truly achieved a momentous task in the 1980s: they made it socially acceptable to 
challenge the PRI. 
The movement only grew as the decade progressed and newspapers documented a 
series of environmental disasters, both within the country and without, that further 
weakened PRI hegemony. An explosion at a Pemex gas plant in San Juan Ixhuatepec 
killed 500 people in November 1984, and sparked both outrage and environmental 
awareness. Less than a year later, a massive earthquake in September 1985 killed around 
10,000 people in Mexico City, spawning the creation of many new environmental 
nongovernmental organizations concerned with providing basic services for hundreds of 
squatter communities whose residents became homeless after the quake.202 Two months 
after the earthquake, the first national meeting of environmental nongovernmental groups 
took place, forming the Pact of Ecologist Groups, which later proved vital in organizing 
opposition to President Miguel de la Madrid’s plans to build Mexico’s first nuclear power 
plant in Laguna Verde, Veracruz. Announced just five months after the nuclear disaster 
of Chernobyl, and with the memories of the Mexico City earthquake still fresh in 
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people’s minds, the Laguna Verde project faced fierce resistance from both these new 
environmental groups and newspapers. Although the government succeeded in building 
the plant, several historians have argued that fear of a nuclear accident (and doubt over 
the federal government’s ability to prevent one) marked the first truly national unification 
around an environmental issue.203 
As this thesis has suggested, newspapers reflected the development of 
environmentalism (and government attempts to co-opt the movement) by providing a 
voice for the many different groups wishing to promote their specific environmental 
narratives. The battle surrounding air pollution centered around narratives crafted by 
reporters serving as public watchdogs and educators, who blamed those responsible for 
its creation, and listed the ill-health effects of breathing in polluted areas. While 
environmental journalists and scientific researchers worked to blame industries for 
disregarding environmental legislation or the federal government for failing to enforce it, 
authoritarian journalists and government spokespeople countered with the narrative that 
the Mexican people lacked environmental awareness, and that their failure to properly 
maintain their vehicles was the biggest contributor to air pollution. 
The forest narrative split into two major themes, environmentalists, researchers, 
and campesinos who worked to document deforestation and its attendant ecological 
degradation and wise-use advocates who believed that forest resources should and could 
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Environmental Reform in Mexico: Salinas’s Preemptive Strategy,” Latin American Perspectives 19, no. 1 
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be better managed to contribute to Mexico’s economy. Authoritarian journalists and 
government spokespeople supported the latter position, and tried to convince the nation 
that the ejido system should be replaced with the privatization of forest resources in order 
to establish a more productive and environmentally-friendly logging regime. 
The battle over water supplies featured narratives similar to those seen with air 
pollution, in which public watchdogs and educators explained the factors behind water 
crises to readers. Environmentalists, the poor, and researchers argued that industries and 
cities were contaminating water supplies and that the federal government was failing to 
protect the nation’s drinking water. Government administrators and authoritarian 
journalists represented the opposing view, which tried to convince readers that the federal 
government was levying fines against polluters and enforcing legislation that safeguarded 
Mexico’s water. 
In all of these issues, Excélsior and Uno Más Uno presented numerous 
environmental narratives concerning Mexico’s resources. Environmentalists, fearing for 
the future of Mexico’s environment and recently emboldened by the PRI’s failure to 
effectively manage the economy, tried to document the damage and blame those 
responsible for causing it or allowing it to happen. They served as the nation’s reality 
check, presenting information as they saw it, not as the PRI wanted it presented. The 
federal government, working to maintain its hegemony and stave off the development of 
any autonomous civic groups, promoted itself as the protector of Mexico’s environment 
and tried to deflect any blame for environmental problems onto other groups, such as 
campesinos, specific corporations, or the Mexican people in general. Despite all of these 
new challenges to the PRI, Mexico’s ruling party remained in control of the nation until 
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2000, even though they had to rig the 1988 presidential election in order to do so.204 So 
although the environmental reporters of these two papers writing in 1983 and 1984 did 
not bring about a regime change with subsequent shifts in environmental policy, they did 
contribute to the legitimization of government criticism and helped spread an awareness 
of environmental issues that still proliferates in Mexico today. 
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Table 1: Distribution of five most popular environmental topics among the 
sample of 216 stories 
 Number of Stories Percentage of Total 
Water Crises 62 29% 
Forests 43 20% 
Air Pollution 28 13% 
Agricultural Problems 22 10% 
Oil Issues 18 8% 
 
Table 2: Distribution of air pollution topics among the sample of 28 stories 
 Number of Occurrences Percentage of Total*** 
Blaming Someone 18 64% 
Linking to Other Issue 14 50% 
Government as Solution 6 21% 
 
***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit 
into multiple categories. 
Table 3: Distribution of forest topics among the sample of 43 stories 
 Number of Occurrences Percentage of Total*** 
“Irracional” Forest Use 27 63% 
Environmental Damage 22 51% 
Government as Solution 8 18% 
 
***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit 
into multiple categories. 
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Table 4: Distribution of water crisis topics among the sample of 62 stories 
 Number of Occurrences Percentage of Total*** 
Blaming Someone 35 56% 
Describing Water 
Crises 
29 47% 
Government as Solution 14 23% 
 
***Numbers do not add up to 100 because some stories have occurrences that fit 
into multiple categories. 
 
Table 5: Number of Narratives Defending the Federal Government by topic 
 Number of Stories Percentage by Category 
Air Pollution 6 21% 
Forests 8 18% 
Water Crises 14 23% 
 
